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

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THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES
ON CICERO, DIONYSIUS
AND ARISTIDES

By HARRY MORTIMER HUBBELL


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THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES

BY

HARRY MORTIMER HUBBELL

A THESIS

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF YALE
UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY



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PREFACE

In quoting from Aristides the edition of Dindorf, Leipzig, 1829, has been used; in quoting from other authors, the latest edition of the text in the Teubner series.

The author is deeply grateful to Professor Hendrickson for suggesting the investigation of which this thesis is the result, and for constant care and criticism at different stages of the work. Thanks are also due to Professor Tukey, of William Jewell College, who read the thesis in manuscript, and offered many helpful suggestions.

H. M. H.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
November, 1913.

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INTRODUCTION

IN the Sophistry of the fifth century we may discern two distinct lines of activity.¹ On the one hand was the study of rhetoric, the most important contribution of the sophists to education. This was undoubtedly the cause of the popularity which was so quickly won by the sophists. At the time when the energy of Athens was being expended in perfecting artistic forms in sculpture and architecture, in drama and history, the sophists in accord with the spirit of the age applied artistic principles to the production of speeches. But rhetoric had its useful as well as its artistic side. Success in litigation came more surely to one who could enhance the value of his arguments by presenting them in a pleasing form, or conceal the weakness of his case by cleverly turned phrases or subtleties which perverted the truth. In the larger relations of public life political power was the reward of the orator who could guide and control the deliberations of the public assembly.

As a second distinguishing characteristic of a sophist we find the ideal of an encyclopaedic education as a preparation for all forms of human activity. This was the sophists' answer to the demand for a broader education to meet the requirements of the growing complexity of life. In presenting themselves as teachers of universal knowledge the sophists attempted to avoid the narrowness of specialization. The sophistical school at its best was not a professional school, although the emphasis laid on forensic rhetoric by some of the sophists tended to narrow their sphere. But the ideal was

¹ For the topics discussed in this introduction cf. H. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, chap. I; H. Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik*; P. Wendland, in *Gött. gelehr. Anz.*, 1913, pp. 53-59; H. Gomperz, in *Wiener Studien*, 27 (1905), pp. 163-207, 28 (1906), pp. 1-42; Nestle, in *Philologus*, 70 (1911), pp. 1-51; Brandstaetter, *De notionibus σοφιστης et σοφιστικῆς*, *Leipziger Studien*, 15 (1894), p. 204.

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INTRODUCTION

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preparation for the *πολιτικός βίος*, or the life of a citizen in all its phases.

The combination of instruction in rhetoric with the ideal of encyclopaedic education is characteristic of all the sophists, but the emphasis was differently placed by different men. Protagoras appears as a teacher of practical business and politics. "A pupil of mine," he says in the Protagoras (318 E), "learns prudence in affairs both private and public. He learns to order his own house, and is best able to act and speak in affairs of state." With this broad general training he combined a certain amount of instruction in rhetoric, just how much it is impossible for us to determine,¹ but it probably did not assume an important part in his system of instruction.

Gorgias on the other hand was first of all a rhetorician. Such philosophical principles as he possessed were of a negative rather than a positive character. His study of eristic was hardly a serious pursuit; rather a means for maintaining paradoxes to amuse his audience. He ridiculed the sophists who claimed to teach virtue. To him Persuasion was the end of all education, the source of all power. Persuasion enables its possessor to control all men, and therefore is the best preparation for the *πολιτικός βίος*. With this as his theory he concentrated all his energy on the technique of rhetoric as the instrument of Persuasion, and particularly on the development of the graces of style. By including epideictic with forensic oratory as the object of his teaching, and by introducing the devices of poetry into prose he prepared the way for large changes in the field of rhetoric. But in everything except form Gorgias was weak. It was the brilliancy of his style rather than the content of his speeches which won for him the immediate applause of Athens.

The union of the two forms of education, rhetorical and

¹ Plat. Phaedrus, 267C: ΦΑΙ. Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἄττα; ΣΩ. Ὅρθοπειά γέ τις, ὃ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ. Quintilian (iii, 1, 12) mentions *communes loci* as part of the rhetorical work of Protagoras.

encyclopaedic, was continued in the fourth century by Isocrates. As a stylist he was the natural successor of Gorgias. So striking were the contributions of Isocrates to the purely formal side of writing that criticism has busied itself with this, and his success as a perfecter of style has obscured the fact that he continued the encyclopaedic education of the sophists of the fifth century. For Isocrates considered himself more than a common orator or teacher of oratory. He regarded himself as a great authority on political questions, made so by his possession of the power of rhetoric, the one means for the acquisition of political insight and political power. The training in rhetoric produces the power to deliberate and the ability both to act and to speak (*πράττειν καὶ λέγειν*). Rhetoric becomes with him as with Gorgias the perfect education; but Isocrates differs from Gorgias in rejecting the hair-splitting eristic and fruitless displays of ingenuity in which Gorgias delighted, and substituting for them discussion of political questions. In so doing he more nearly fulfilled the ideal of teaching *πολιτικὴ ἀρετή*, and the content of his teaching was similar to that of Protagoras, while at the same time he maintained the emphasis on rhetoric as a form of education. It is this insistence on the value of general education secured through rhetoric which makes Isocrates the successor of the sophists of the fifth century.

As the opponent of the sophistical ideal we find Socrates as presented in Plato, who rejects the sophistical rhetoric and makes knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) the end of education,—a knowledge which must be the foundation of any true rhetoric. Isocrates and Plato are in this exact opposites. To Plato a political science is possible, and is the necessary antecedent of rhetoric; to Isocrates *ἐπιστήμη* is impossible; rhetoric is both an end in itself and a means to the acquisition of an accuracy of judgment (*δόξα*) which is the best guide to all action. The two ideals were diametrically opposite, and anything like a compromise between them was impossible. There sprang up

between philosopher and rhetorician the most intense rivalry for the privilege of training the young men. The details of the conflict after the time of Isocrates are difficult to follow; this much is certain, that the conflict was ended for a time by the complete triumph of philosophy. Rhetoric was reduced to a study of style and the technique of argumentation.

But in the first century before our era there was a revolt against the narrowing of the province of rhetoric. To the reformers rhetoric seemed to have suffered from being deprived of the richness of content which it had possessed before the rise of the philosophical schools,—on the other hand philosophy, while absorbing the content of political rhetoric had weakened itself by becoming entirely theoretical, and withdrawing from active participation in political life. The attempt was made to restore the vitality of the old sophistical ideal and to combine philosophy and rhetoric in such a way that philosophy would be the servant of rhetoric. In this revival the influence of Isocrates, the most skillful exponent of this ideal, naturally played a large part. It is the purpose of this dissertation to trace this influence on some representatives of the revival of the early conception of rhetorical education.

THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES

ISOCRATES

THIS chapter aims to present Isocrates' views of the purpose of oratory, and the powers of the orator. It will contain little that has not already been made part of the common store of knowledge in the pages of Blass and Jebb, and in several minor treatises.¹ My excuse for presenting the facts anew is twofold: first, my conclusions are based on an independent study of the material, and will, I hope, add some new points; secondly, it has seemed necessary in tracing the influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and others, to begin with a statement of the principles of Isocrates which were followed by these writers. My account of Isocrates' theories will be somewhat one-sided, inasmuch as I shall not attempt to trace the influence exerted by his theories of rhythm, or by his style, but shall deal only with the larger aspect of his pedagogical purpose.

In Ant., 180 ff., Isocrates describes what he calls *φιλοσοφία*.² "We have a dual nature, body and mind. The function of the mind is to deliberate, both about one's own affairs and

¹ E. g., Ad. Büchle, Die Pädagogik des Isocrates, Prog. Baden, 1873; Matthiessen, Einige Andeutungen über die Richtung und den Einfluss der Isokrateischen Schule, Prog. Plön, 1865; R. Rauchenstein, Ausgewählte Reden des Isokrates, Panegyricus und Areopagiticus, Dritte Auflage, 1864, pp. 5 ff.

I regret that I have been unable to obtain several dissertations which apparently bear on this subject.

² On the meaning of *φιλοσοφία* and related words see von Arnim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, pp. 62 ff.; Jebb, Attic Orators, II, 34 ff.; Thompson on Plato, Phaedrus, 278D; Wilamowitz, Aus Kydathen, p. 215; Radermacher in Rh. Mus., LII (1897), pp. 17 ff. For other names for his *φιλοσοφία* cf. Ant., 50: *δύναμις*, *διατριβή*, Ant., 177: *ἡ τῶν λόγων μελέτη*, Ep., V, 4: *παιδεία ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους*.

affairs of state; that of the body is to obey the directions of the mind. For the development of these two parts of our nature our ancestors devised two courses of training,—athletics for the body, and ‘philosophy’ for the mind. The teachers of ‘philosophy’ proceed as follows: first they teach the ‘ideas,’¹ which are used in a speech, then they drill their pupils in fitting these ‘ideas’ together in a speech. This fixes the ‘ideas’ in the mind and enables the student to make better estimates of the proper course of action (*καιρός*), under any circumstances.”² The word *δόξα* he uses here because there is no such thing as *knowledge* (*ἐπιστήμη*) of the future; the best one can do is to study and infer what is going to happen (*θεωρεῖν τὸ σύμβαινον*). It is interesting to notice how quickly Isocrates shifts from the purely rhetorical side of his instruction to the preparation which it gives for practical life. In another passage of the *Antidosis* we have the same thought with a slightly different wording: “Since it is not in the power of man to acquire knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) which will enable one to know what one should do or say (cf. *καιρῶν ἐγγυτέρω . . . γένωνται*, *Ant.*, 184, quoted above) I consider those wise who are able to get the best results by use of opinion (*δόξα*), and by ‘philosophers’ I mean those who devote themselves to acquiring this practical insight (*φρόνησις*) in the shortest time.”³

This practical aim of all his teaching is shown indirectly

¹ *Ant.*, 183.

² *Ant.*, 184: *ἵνα ταῦτα βεβαιότερον κατέσχωσι καὶ τῶν καιρῶν ἐγγυτέρω ταῖς δόξαις γένωνται*. Cf. *Ant.*, 271: *σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖτοις διατρίβοντας, ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα γήγονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν*. Cf. also *Ep.*, V, 4; *Helen*, 5.

³ *Ant.*, 271: *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμῃ λαβεῖν, ἣν ἔχοντες ἂν εἰδέμεν ὃ τι πρακτέον ἢ λεκτέον ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖτοις διατρίβοντας, ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήγονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν*. Cf. *Adv. Soph.*, 2–8.

This idea of meeting the *καιρός* comes out again in the treatise *Adv. Soph.*, 16: *ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ διαμαρτεῖν . . . (17) ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι*.

in the passages in which he condemns other studies. Eristic, astronomy and geometry are useful studies, particularly as a preparation for 'philosophy' but they are despised by the average man, because they have no practical value,—they have no connection with life.¹ But Isocrates' school provided the best training for life in all its forms, so that his students became orators, generals, kings and tyrants,² and those who did not enter public service showed their training by the virtue and refinement of their private lives.³ To sum up his theory in modern terms, he provided training in oratory, statesmanship (including generalship) and ethics, or, stated from a different viewpoint, Isocrates unites in himself the three persons of orator,⁴ statesman and philosopher.

In discussing the different phases of Isocrates' instruction, it is necessary to begin with his teaching of rhetoric. This is the one essential subject, and from this all the other results

¹ Ant., 262: οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν εἶναι χρήσιμον, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς μνείαις οὐδένα χρόνον ἐμμένειν ταῖς τῶν μαθόντων διὰ τὸ μήτε τῷ βίῳ παρακολουθεῖν μήτε ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐπαμύνειν ἀλλ' ἔξω παντάπασιν εἶναι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. Cf. Panath., 26 ff.; Helen, 4, 5.

We may compare other passages in which λέγειν is coupled with φρονεῖν and related words which express the phase of Isocrates' teaching which I have just mentioned.

Ant., 308: τοὺς διαφέροντας καὶ πρότεροντας . . . τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν. Paneg., 50: τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους. Ant., 293: πρόχετε καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων . . . (294) τῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἕμενον πεπαιδευθῆναι τῶν ἄλλων. Ant., 266: φιλοσοφίαν μὲν οὐκ οἶμαι δεῖν προσαγορεύειν τὴν μὴδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μήτε πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μήτε πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ὠφελοῦσαν. Ant., 277: ἅμα τὸ λέγειν εὖ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν παραγενησεται τοῖς φιλοσόφως καὶ φιλοτιμῶς πρὸς τοὺς λόγους διακειμένοις. Ant., 226: ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πλέουσι καὶ χρήματα διδάσκει καὶ πάντα ποιῶσι νομίζοντες αὐτοὶ τε βελτίους γενήσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε παιδεύοντας πολὺ φρονιμωτέρους εἶναι τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς.

² Ant., 30; Ep., IV, 2; Ant., 40.

³ Ep., IV, 2: οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ βίου σώφρονες καὶ χαρίεντες.

⁴ I use the term "orator" in spite of the fact that Isocrates did not deliver any of his works in public. He was deterred by his lack of a good voice and self assurance (φωνὴ ἱκανὴ καὶ τόλμα, Panath., 10; Phil., 81; Ep., VIII, 7), and devoted his talents to writing. However from Isocrates' point of view *writing* has the same effect on the author as *speaking*.

of Isocratean teaching come automatically. After stating¹ that the wise (*σοφοί*) are those whose "opinion" (*δόξα*) is a safe guide in directing word and action, he proceeds with a feigned diffidence to explain how one may obtain this power.² "There is no art that can implant temperance and justice (*σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη*) in those whose natural endowment is defective; but some improvement is possible for every one." *Ant.*, 275: ἡγοῦμαι . . . αὐτοὺς γ' αὐτῶν βελτίους ἂν γίγνεσθαι καὶ πλείονος ἀξίους εἰ πρὸς τε τὸ λέγειν εὖ φιλοτίμως διατεθεῖεν καὶ τοῦ πείθειν δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐρασθεῖεν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῆς πλεονεξίας ἐπιθυμήσαιεν, μὴ τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνοήτων νομιζομένης ἀλλὰ τῆς ὡς ἀληθῶς τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἐχούσης. καὶ ταῦθ' ὡς οὕτω πέφυκε ταχέως οἶμαι δηλώσειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ λέγειν ἢ γράφειν προαιρούμενος λόγους ἀξίους ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ποιήσεται τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀδίκους ἢ μικρὰς ἢ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων, ἀλλὰ μεγάλας καὶ καλὰς καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων· μὴ γὰρ τοιαύτας εὐρίσκων οὐδὲν διαπράξεται τῶν δεόντων. ἔπειτα τῶν πράξεων τῶν συντεινουσῶν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐκλέγεται τὰς πρεπωδεστάτας καὶ μάλιστα συμφερούσας· ὁ δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας συνθείζόμενος θεωρεῖν καὶ δοκιμάζειν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα λόγον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει ταύτην δύναμιν, ὥστ' ἅμα τὸ λέγειν εὖ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν παραγενήσεται τοῖς φιλοσόφως καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τοὺς λόγους διακειμένοις. That is, the course in rhetoric is the foundation, and one who has taken it will acquire the virtues needed in public and private life. Let us therefore consider first the nature of his rhetorical instruction.

Three things contribute to make a successful orator,—natural ability, practice and education.³ Of these three, natural ability is essential, and experience is next in importance; education contributes to make the perfect orator, but is not absolutely necessary, and is useless without the two others. This is set forth in *Antidosis*, 186–192, particularly in the following passages:

¹ *Ant.*, 271.

² *Ant.*, 272: ἃ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ταύτην ἔχοντα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχω μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὁκῶ δὲ λέγειν.

³ Cf. Shorey in *T. A. P. A.*, 1909, pp. 185 ff.

(189) εἰ δὲ δὴ τις . . . ἔροιτό με, τί τούτων μεγίστην ἔχει δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν λόγων παιδείαν, ἀποκριναίμην ἂν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀνυπέρβλητόν ἐστι καὶ πολὺ πάντων διαφέρει.

(191) καὶ μὲν δὴ κάκείνους ἴσμεν τοὺς καταδεεστέραν μὲν τούτων τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντας, ταῖς δ' ἐμπειρίαις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις προέχοντας, ὅτι γίγνονται κρείττους οὐ μόνον αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εὖ μὲν πεφυκότων, λίαν δ' αὐτῶν κατημεληκότων.¹

(192) περὶ δὲ τῆς παιδείας οὐκ ἔχω τοιοῦτον λόγον εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὁμοίαν οὔτε παραπλησίαν ἔχει τούτοις τὴν δύναμιν. εἰ γὰρ τις διακούσειεν ἅπαντα τὰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ διακριβωθείη μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, λόγων μὲν ποιητῆς τυχὸν ἂν χαριέστερος γένοιτο τῶν πολλῶν, εἰς ὄχλον δὲ καταστάς, τούτου μόνον ἀποστερηθεὶς τοῦ τολμᾶν, οὐδ' ἂν φθέξασθαι δυνηθείη.²

But, though education alone is not as valuable as natural ability or experience, the combination of natural ability and education produces a wonderful result.

(190) τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τυχῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος (i. e., well endowed by nature) παιδείας, μὴ τῆς ἀπηκριβωμένης ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐπιπολαίου καὶ πᾶσι κοινῆς, τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη ῥήτωρ, ὅλος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ τις τῶν Ἑλλήνων γέγονεν;

The task of reconstructing the τέχνη of Isocrates has been performed by Sheehan in his dissertation *De Fide Artis Rhetoricae Isocrati Tributae*. It is therefore necessary for me merely to emphasize some phases of this subject which are needed to explain the broader aspects of Isocrates' teaching. We have seen from the passage quoted above (Ant., 183 f.) that he divided his course into two parts: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες τὰς ἰδέας ἀπάσας, αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. This is the first step. The second consists in repeated practice in weaving these together to form a speech.³ The second part need not detain us, but the ἰδέαι need further elucidation.

¹ Cf. Ant., 185.

² Cf. Adv. Soph., 15.

³ The same division in Adv. Soph., 16-18.

The meanings of *ιδέα* and its equivalent *εἶδος* in Isocrates have been fully discussed by A. E. Taylor in his article, "The Words *εἶδος*, *ιδέα* in Pre-Platonic Literature" (*Varia Socratica*, pp. 178-267).¹ He finds the following meanings.

1. The way in which a man "carries himself," *Ad Nic.*, 34.
2. "Class," *Ant.*, 280.
3. "Situation," "state of affairs," *Nic.*, 44.
4. An *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος*, a determinate *φύσις* or "real essence," *Nic.*, 30; *Hel.*, 54, 58.
5. *σχῆμα λόγου*, i. e., (a) an artificial construction of words (*σχῆμα λέξεως*), *Evag.*, 9; *Hel.*, 11; *Panath.*, 2; *Soph.*, 16; *Ant.*, 46, 47; or (b) a rhetorically effective turn given to the thought expressed (*σχῆμα διανοίας*), *Ep.*, VI, 8, or (c) the "style or manner" appropriate to a literary genre as a whole, *Ad Nic.*, 48; *Paneg.*, 7; *Phil.*, 143; *Hel.*, 15; *Bus.*, 33; *Soph.*, 17; *Ant.*, 11, 74, 183.

The only points at which I would dissent from his interpretation are *Adv. Soph.*, 16, and *Ep.*, VI, 8. I quote the passages in full:

Adv. Soph., 16: *φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἀπαντας καὶ λέγομεν καὶ συντίθεμεν, λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐκ εἶναι τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν, ἣν τις αὐτὸν παραδῶ μὴ τοῖς ῥαδίως ὑπισχνουμένοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι τι περὶ αὐτῶν· τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ὅς δεῖ προελέσθαι καὶ μῖξαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξαι κατὰ τρόπον, ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ὄλον τὸν λόγον καταποικίλαι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν, (17) ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι, καὶ δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν πρὸς τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ὅταν χρή, τὰ μὲν εἶδη τὰ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, περὶ δὲ τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν γυμνασθῆναι κτλ.*

Taylor considers that Isocrates here refers to the *σχήματα*

¹ Cf. also Navarre, *Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote*, pp. 189 ff.; Jebb, *Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus*, II, p. 37, n. 4; Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, II², p. 32, ff., 108 ff., p. 119 and notes; Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, p. 533, n. 2; M. Sheehan, *De Fide Artis Rhetoricae Isocrati Tributae*, p. 20.

of Gorgias, and more generally, to the variety of "styles," "manners" taught by the rhetoricians. He identifies the *ιδέαι* with *εἶδη τὰ τῶν λόγων* in 17. Here I am forced to believe that he is mistaken. Isocrates is making two distinct divisions of his course of study; first the *ιδέαι*, easy to acquire; second (beginning with the words *τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ*) the use of these in preparing a speech—a matter requiring much study. It is with reference to this end, namely the adaptation of the *ιδέαι* to the different kinds of speeches, that the words *καὶ δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν κτλ.* (17) apply.

The *ιδέαι* I take to be not only the *σχήματα* of Gorgias, but the thought elements or ideas, as we should call them, which the orator has ready as a part of his stock in trade. This will appear more fully from the following passage.

Ep., VI, 8: *εἰθισμαι γὰρ λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν διατρίβοντας, ὅτι τοῦτο πρῶτον δεῖ σκέψασθαι, τί τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου μέρεσι διαπρακτέον ἐστίν· ἐπειδὴν δὲ τοῦθ' εὖρωμεν καὶ διακριβώσωμεθα, ζητητέον εἶναι φημι τὰς ἰδέας, δι' ὧν ταῦτ' ἐξεργασθήσεται καὶ λήψεται τέλος, ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα.*

Here *ιδέαι* does not mean the *εἶδη λόγων* nor even the divisions of a speech. It can only mean the *σχήματα λέξεως* and the thought elements or ideas. It is impossible to suppose that Isocrates meant to attain the end which the speech was designed to reach, simply by a choice of rhetorical figures. These may be included under *ιδέαι*, but the term also includes the stock of commonplace arguments with which the student of a rhetorical school was supplied.

Thus the word *ιδέα* has in both passages the meaning of elements, whether of thought or rhetorical form, out of which a speech is composed. This is only a broadening of Taylor's view, and is in harmony with his conclusions as to the meaning of *ιδέαι* in science.

Blass also (Att. Bered., II², 108 f.) seems to incline to this view. "Was dieser *εἶδη* oder *ιδέαι* seiner Reden nennt, sind die Elemente, aus deren Mischung jede Rede sich bildet,

entsprechend den σχήματα in der Gymnastik und von begrenzter wenn auch nicht kleiner Zahl, so dass ein Wissen und ein Lehren derselben möglich ist. Man wird dabei bald an die 7 εἶδη des Anaximenes erinnert: Lob, Tadel, Anklage, Verteidigung u.s.f., bald an die εἶδη und τόποι (oder στοιχεῖα) des Aristoteles; denn der Ausdruck εἶδος besagt dem Isokrates alles und nichts, und es heisst so die ganze Gattung von Reden wie die Species und ferner das Enthymem und die Figur, je nach Umständen."¹

The comparison to the use of στοιχεῖον in Aristotle is interesting because στοιχεῖον is there used with the same double meaning which ἰδέα and εἶδος carry in Isocrates. In Rhet., II, 22, 13 = 1396 b, 21 and 26, 1 = 1403 a, 17, it is equivalent to τόπος ἐνθυμημάτων. In Rhet., I, 2, 22 = 1358 a, 35, and Rhet., I, 6, 1 = 1362 a, 20, it means the ideas. The last passage I quote in full: ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλευόντι σκόπος τὸ συμφέρον, βουλευόνται γὰρ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν, ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἀπλῶς. Then follows an analysis of "good." Some such material, though in a vastly more elementary form I conceive to have been what Isocrates meant by ἰδέαι in the two passages quoted above. It would also include such a treatment of government as is given by Aristotle in chapters 4 and 8 of Book I.²

How Isocrates presented this part of his teaching we may fairly estimate from certain passages. The peculiar character of the speech entitled πρὸς Νικοκλέα has been noted by Blass (Att. Bered., II³, 274 f.). It is composed of short, disconnected passages, almost in the style of proverbs, quite differ-

¹ Cf. Sheehan, o. c., p. 20: ea didicisse, e quibus orationes conflarentur atque in his usurpandis sese exercuisse.

Also Blass, p. 32, n. 2: (also die ἰδέαι als Elemente der Reden, nicht als Arten).

² For a similar interpretation cf. Navarre, p. 190: Autre part le mot ne peut guère se traduire que par *idées*, dans le sens que ce mot a pris en français. (Lettre aux fils de Jason (VI), 8.)

ent from the smooth and verbose style in which Isocrates ordinarily writes. The reason for this is, I think, not far to seek. Isocrates has here put together without the usual rhetorical embellishment a collection of *lêtai* on government and private morality such as he put before his students. It is in fact an outline of some of his lectures on government. Similarly in *Ant.*, 117 ff., and *Panath.*, 82 ff., we have the *lêtai* on the qualifications and duties of a general. In *Ant.*, 217 ff., we have an analysis of the motives for wrong-doing which smacks of the lecture room rather than the court room (v. Appendix).

It is noticeable that while Isocrates is continually talking about himself and his profession, he says very little that is of aid to us in reconstructing his educational system in detail. One point he does make plain—that he is unique among educators.¹ This is partly due to the fact that like all rhetoricians he is superior to the teachers of eristic, astronomy and geometry because he is more practical, partly to the fact that he is superior to other rhetoricians in his choice of subjects. He does not waste his time on petty subjects or cases in the courts of law, but writes about great national issues and topics of large human interest.² His own speeches

¹ *Ant.*, 148: σὲ . . . ἀνομῶς ζῶντα καὶ τοῖς σοφισταῖς καὶ τοῖς ἰδιωταῖς καὶ τοῖς πολλὰ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπόρως διακειμένοις.

² His attempt to obscure the fact that he had been a *λογογράφος* leads him to a violent attack on the *λογογράφοι* and the rhetoricians who teach simply the art of pleading before a jury.

Panath., 11: ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ γράφειν, ἃ διανοηθεῖν, κατέφυγον, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιεύμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων οὐδὲ περὶ ὧν ἄλλοι τινὲς ληροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων.

Ant., 227: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτω τινὲς ἀγνωμόνως ἔχουσιν ὥστ' εἰδότες καὶ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους καὶ τοὺς προεστῶτας τῆς παιδείας . . . τῶν λόγων ἐπιθυμοῦντας, οὐ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις συμβολαίοις λεγομένων οὐδὲ τῶν λυπούντων τινὰς ἀλλὰ τῶν παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκιμούντων, ὅμως τοιμῶσι βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ λέγειν, ὅς ταύτην ποιοῦνται τὴν μελέτην, ὧ' ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον πλεονεκτῶσιν.

Cf. also *Ant.*, 2, 38, 40, 42, 260, 276; *Panath.*, 1, 2; *Nic.*, 7.

illustrate his theory, treating the relations between Greece and Persia (Panegyricus, Philippus), the relations between Greek states (Plataicus, On the Peace, Archidamus), and the constitution of Athens (Areopagiticus).¹ It is this breadth of subject matter, this exaltation of the orator above the mere pleader in the law court which enables Isocrates to claim for the orator the right to speak on all subjects, and to make the study of oratory the basis of his course of universal culture. With this treatment of the orator's training, let us turn to its effects in practice.

THE ORATOR AS A STATESMAN AND GENERAL

"All the blessings of human society proceed from Persuasion. In other qualities man is inferior to many animals. But once the power of persuasion was given to us we ceased to live like brutes, and formed a society, founded cities, established laws, invented arts—speech has aided man in nearly everything that he has devised. It is this which has established our laws defining what is just and unjust, honorable and base, without which society would be impossible. It is by this that we convict the guilty and praise the good. With this we educate the ignorant and test the wise. For proper speech is the best evidence of sound practical wisdom. With this we debate about doubtful subjects, and investigate the unknown. For in taking counsel we use the same arguments that we use in persuading an audience, and we apply the name *ρητορικοί* to those able to make a public address, *εὐβουλοι* to those able to debate with themselves

¹ In addition his didactic speeches deal with political questions. Ad Nic., 2: ἡγησάμην δ' ἂν γενέσθαι ταύτην καλλίστην δωρεάν καὶ χρησιμωτάτην καὶ μάλιστα πρέπουσαν ἐμοὶ τε δοῦναι καὶ σοὶ λαβεῖν, εἰ δυνηθείην ὀρίσαι, πόλιν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὀρεγόμενος καὶ τίνων [ἔργων] ἀπεχόμενος ἄριστ' ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν διοικῶς.

Ibid., 6: καθ' ὅλων δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ὧν χρὴ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν διατρίβειν, ἐγὼ περᾶσομαι διελθεῖν.

Ibid., 9: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον, τί τῶν βασιλευνόντων ἔργον ἐστίν.

Ibid., 16: ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν.

about what is expedient. In short, all men of great executive ability have had oratorical ability as part of their equipment, λόγος has been their guide in thought and action, and the men of the highest intelligence have made the greatest use of it."¹

In this way Isocrates connects oratorical ability with statesmanship. His theory he supports by examples from Athenian history. Clisthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles and Pericles are cited with the words: εὐρήσετε γάρ, ἣν ἐξετάζητε τούτων ἕκαστον, οὐ τοὺς συκοφαντικῶς βεβιωκότας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀμελῶς οὐδὲ τοὺς τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁμοίους ὄντας ταῦτα διαπεπραγμένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς διαφέροντας καὶ προέχοντας μὴ μόνον ταῖς εὐγενεαῖς καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τούτους ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους γεγενημένους.²

In another portion of the Antidosis he enumerates Solon, Clisthenes, Themistocles and Pericles, and dwells at greater length on their oratory:

εὐρήσετε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πολιτευομένων καὶ τῶν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότων τοὺς πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν λόγων ποιουμένους βελτίστους ὄντας τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα παριόντων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους ῥήτορας καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν λαβόντας πλείστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους τῇ πόλει γεγενημένους.³

τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν τηλικαῦτα διαπραξαμένων οὐδεὶς λόγων ἡμέλησεν, ἀλλὰ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων προσέσχον αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν, ὥστε Σόλων μὲν τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφιστῶν ἐκλήθη καὶ ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν νῦν ἀτιμαζομένην.⁴

So far we have considered the fitness of the orator for leadership in civil life. But Isocrates claims also that the best generals are orators. This, too, is illustrated by the practice of the Athenians in previous generations.

¹ Nic., 5-9, repeated verbatim in Ant., 253-257. Cf. Paneg., 47-50.

² Ant., 306-308.

³ Ant., 231. Notice especially in addition to the passage quoted above the following phrases: Κλεισθένης . . . λόγῳ πέλας. (232) Θεμιστοκλῆς . . . ὅ τις ἂν οἶός τ' ἐγένετο πείσαι μὴ πολὺ τῷ λόγῳ διανεγκών; (233) Περικλῆς καὶ δημαγωγὸς ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος (234).

⁴ Ant., 235. Cf. 313: Σόλωνα μὲν γάρ, τὸν πρῶτον τῶν πολιτῶν λαβόντα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην (σοφιστήν), προστάτην ἤξιωσαν τῆς πόλεως εἶναι.

τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων, ὅσον ἐκείνοι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς προστάτας τε τῆς πόλεως ἐποιούντο καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἡρῶντο, νομίζοντες τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλευσαὶ δυνάμενον, τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον ἀριστ' ἂν συμβουλευσασθαι καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν γενόμενον, ἡμεῖς δὲ τούναντιον τούτων ποιούμεν.¹

We find the application of this theory in the narrative of the campaigns of Timotheus, and the reasons given for his success.² He succeeded, says Isocrates, while other generals failed, because of his better equipment. The ordinary Athenian generals were chosen because they possessed fine physique, or had seen long service as mercenaries.³ Timotheus was physically inferior and had no experience as a soldier, but he had a wide knowledge of international relations.⁴ Relying on men whose experience lay wholly in war for the details of the campaign, he was able to devote his attention to the larger aspects of the war.⁵ He knew what a true general must know: with whom to fight, and with whom to conclude an alliance;⁶ how to collect an army adapted to the war at hand, organize it and use it advantageously;⁷ how to bear the hardships of army life and how to relieve them;⁸ how to conciliate neutrals as well as conquer his enemies;⁹ how to show mercy to the vanquished;¹⁰ finally he was able to put an end

¹ De Pace., 54. Cf. Panath., 143.

² Ant., 101-139.

³ Ant., 116: ἡμεῖς γὰρ χειροτονεῖτε στρατηγοὺς τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους τοῖς σώμασι καὶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς ξενικοῖς στρατεύμασι γεγενημένους.

⁴ Ant., 115: Τιμόθεος δ' οὐτε τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν ἔχων ἑρρωμένην οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοῖς πλανωμένοις κατατετριμμένος ἀλλὰ μεθ' ὧν πολитеυόμενος . . . (116) περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ συμμαχικῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τῆς τούτων οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμῶν γνώμην εἶχεν.

⁵ Ant., 116: ὁ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τοιοῦτοις λοχαγοῖς ἐχρήτο καὶ ταξιάρχους, αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ ταῦτα δευνὸς ἦν, περὶ ἅπερ χρή φρόνιμον εἶναι τὸν στρατηγὸν τὸν ἀγαθόν.

⁶ Ant., 117: πρὸς τίνας πολεμήτεον καὶ τίνας συμμαχεύου ποιητέον.

⁷ Ant., 119: δεύτερον . . . στρατόπεδον συναγαγεῖν ἀρμόττον τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ παρόντι καὶ τοῦτο συντάξαι καὶ χρήσασθαι συμφερόντως.

⁸ Ant., 120: ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τοῦτοις ἀπορίας ἐνεγκεῖν στρατοπέδου καὶ πέντας, καὶ πάλιν εὐπορίας εὐρεῖν.

⁹ Ant., 122: τῇ μὲν δυνάμει τοὺς τῆς πόλεως πολεμίους κατεστρέφετο, τῷ δ' ἦβει τὴν εὐνοίαν τὴν τῶν ἄλλων προσήγετο.

¹⁰ Ant., 125: τὰς δοριαλώτους τῶν πόλεων οὕτω πρῶως διώκει καὶ νομίμως, ὥς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τὰς συμμαχίδας.

to the reign of terror which had disgraced the period of Athenian supremacy.¹

Such were the virtues of Timotheus, whom we may call Isocrates' ideal general. They are the virtues of the Isocratean orator-statesman, the man who can write or speak *περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων*,² and can *ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου*.³ Isocrates put his theory into practice and gave advice on military questions in the epistle to Timotheus (VII) and in the Philippus (87, 105), and accompanied Timotheus on many of his expeditions.⁴

THE ORATOR AS A PHILOSOPHER

One division of philosophy has been treated under the heading "The Orator as a Statesman." We saw (p. 9) that Isocrates wrote not only treatises on actual political conditions, such as the Panegyricus, Philippus, Plataicus, On the Peace, Archidamus, but also treatises on politics in the abstract,—the Nicocles. Thus he occupies two positions: he is a practical statesman, and a political philosopher. But his teaching goes still deeper. He is not able to make all his pupils great orators and statesmen; nature has denied them the necessary endowment; all however gain moral power and charm of manner.⁵

¹ Ant., 127: ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου στρατηγίας οὐδεὶς ἀνὸν ἄναστάσεις εἶροι γεγενημένας οὔτε πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς οὔτε σφαγὰς καὶ φυγὰς . . . ἀλλ' οὕτως αἱ τοιαῦται συμφοραὶ κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἐλώφησαν, ὥστε μόνος ὢν ἡμεῖς μνημονεύομεν ἀνέγκλητον τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι παρέσχευ.

² Panath., 11.

³ Ant., 271.

⁴ Plut. Vit., 837C: σὺν φ (Timotheus) καὶ πολλὰς πόλεις ἐπῆλθε συντιθεὶς τὰς πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ὑπὸ Τιμοθίου πεμπομένας ἐπιστολάς.

⁵ Ep., IV, 2: ἐμοὶ γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν συγγεγενημένων ἀνδρῶν καὶ δόξας ἐνίων μεγάλας ἔχόντων, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπάντων οἱ μὲν τινες περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ διανοηθῆναι καὶ πράξαι δεινοὶ γεγονόασιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ βίου σώφρονες καὶ χαρίεντες πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας χρήσεις καὶ διαγωγὰς ἀφνεῖς παντάπασιν.

We may distinguish an indirect and a direct source of this moral improvement. Indirectly, as the training in speaking promoted knowledge of statesmanship, so it makes the speaker virtuous.

Ant., 278: καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὁ πείθειν βουλόμενος ἀμελήσει τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἄλλιστα προσέξει τὸν νοῦν, ὅπως δόξαν ὡς ἐπικειστώτην λήψεται παρὰ τοῖς συμπολιτευομένοις. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀληθεστέρους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν εὖ διακειμένων λεγομένους ἢ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν διαβεβλημένων, καὶ τὰς πίστεις μείζον δυναμένας τὰς ἐκ τοῦ βίου γεγενημένας ἢ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πεπορισμένας; ὥσθ' ὅσ' ἂν τις ἐρρωμενεστέρωι ἐπιθυμῇ πείθειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τοσοῦτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀσκήσει καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις εὐδοκίμεῖν.—280. τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν εἶναι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν οὐ μόνον τὸν λόγον πιστότερον ἐποίησεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν ἔχοντος ἐντιμοτέρας κατέστησεν, ὑπὲρ οὗ σπουδαστέον ἐστὶ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

Aside from this incentive to right living which every orator has, the pupils of Isocrates received from him direct moral teaching. We have seen (p. 11) that the instruction in *ιδέαι* included an analysis of motives such as is given in *Antidosis*, 217. But it is as a preacher of virtue rather than a teacher that Isocrates finds his true sphere of influence. Not only, he says, is there an utter lack of evidence that he corrupts the young men who attend his school,¹ but he encourages them to be virtuous,² and does this better than those who make a pretense of turning men to lives of virtue.³ He lays particular emphasis on the moral value of his speeches.⁴

¹ Ant., 30, 60, 86, 92, 101, 175, 197, 198, 215, 240, 241.

² Virtue is not *teachable*, Adv. Soph., 21.

³ Ant., 84: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην προσποιουμένων προτρέπων ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀληθεστέροι καὶ χρησιμώτεροι φανείμεν ὄντες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἀγνοουμένην, ὑπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τοῦτων ἀντιλεγομένην, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην.

⁴ Ant., 60: ἐθυμήθητε δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς, εἰ δοκῶ τοῖς λόγοις διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους ἀλλὰ μὴ προτρέπειν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνους.

Metaphysics with eristic he rejects. This is inevitable for one who inclines so decidedly to the practical. The principal passage is in the introduction to the Helen. After a statement of the doctrines of Protagoras, Gorgias, Zeno and Melissus he says: (4) ἀλλ' ὁμως οὕτω φανερώς ἐκείνων ἐπιδειξάντων, ὅτι ῥαδιόν ἐστι, περὶ ὧν ἂν τις πρόθηται, ψευδῇ μηχανήσασθαι λόγον, ἔτι περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον διατρίβουσιν· οὓς ἐχρῆν ἀφεμένους ταύτης τῆς τερθρείας, τῆς ἐν μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἐξελέγχειν προσποιουμένης, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις πολλὴν ἤδη χρόνον ἐξεληλεγμένης, τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν αἷς πολιτευόμεθα, τοὺς συνόντας παιδεύειν, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τούτων γυμνάζειν, ἐνθυμουμένους, ὅτι πολλὸν κρεῖττόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ μικρὸν προέχειν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις μᾶλλον ἢ πολὺ διαφέρειν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφελοῦσιν.

In another passage (Ant., 258–269) he admits that these studies have some value, and that they are useful as a preparation for “philosophy”; but the student must not allow his soul to be starved by such fruitless speculation.¹

67: πάντες οἱ λόγοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην συντελνουσιν. Cf. Ant., 76–78.

¹ Ant., 268: διατρίψαι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταύτας χρόνον τινα συμβουλευσάμ' ἂν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μέντοι περιδεῖν τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν κατασκελεταιθεῖσαν ἐπὶ τοῖς, μηδ' ἐξοκειλάσαν εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τέτταρα κτλ.

CICERO

It has frequently been pointed out that Isocrates had a strong influence on Cicero. Jebb, a most sympathetic interpreter of Isocrates, has noted the resemblance both in literary style and personal character.¹ Blass also notices the effect of Isocrates' style on Cicero, and through him on modern writers.² But both have confined their observations to Cicero's imitation of style.³ It is the object of this chapter to show that Cicero derived from Isocrates the idea of the function of the orator which he presents in the *De Oratore*.

A discussion of the sources of the *De Oratore* naturally begins with a consideration of the letter to Lentulus⁴ in which we have the following description (23): *scripsi etiam—nam ab orationibus diiungo me fere referoque ad mansuetiores Musas, quae me nunc maxime, sicut iam a prima adulescentia delectarunt—scripsi igitur, Aristotelio more, quem admodum quidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de oratore, quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutiles; abhorrent enim a communibus praeceptis atque omnem antiquorum, et Aristoteliam et Isocrateam, rationem oratoriam complectuntur.*

Here Cicero definitely announces his work, *De Oratore*, as an adaptation of the theories of the two great ancient masters,

¹ *Attic Orators*, II, 32 f., 69.

² *Attische Beredsamkeit*, II², 212 f.

³ Cf. Jebb, II, 68 f.: But the best representative of Isocrates in his influence on the development of oratory is Cicero. Cicero was intellectually stronger than Isocrates. . . . But as a stylist he is inferior to Isocrates. The idea which Cicero got from Isocrates was that of number. To this Cicero added special Isocratic graces with more than the richness but with less than the elegance of the Greek master. Seldom, perhaps, has an unconscious criticism on self told the truth more neatly than does the phrase of Cicero when he speaks of having used "all the fragrant essences of Isocrates and all the little stores of his disciples." The brilliancy of Isocrates had come to Cicero through the school of Rhodes.

⁴ *Ad Fam.*, I, 9: quoted in this connection by Piderit in his 6th edition of the *De Oratore*, p. 12, n. 38.

Isocrates and Aristotle. I hope to show in the following pages that Cicero's debt to Isocrates is not merely in rhythm and style, as has commonly been supposed,¹ but that his whole attitude toward oratory as an art is drawn from Isocrates.² Before beginning a discussion of the parallel passages in the two authors, it may not be out of place to quote some passages in which Cicero expresses his admiration for Isocrates, and some references to Isocrates' works which show that he drew these ideas immediately from Isocrates, and not from a later treatise on rhetoric.

First the passages that show his admiration for Isocrates:

De Orat., II, 3, 10: ille pater eloquentiae—Isocrates.

De Orat., II, 13, 57: Postea vero ex clarissima quasi rhetoris officina duo praestantes ingenio, Theopompus et Ephorus, ab Isocrate magistro impulsī se ad historiam conulerunt.

De Orat., II, 22, 94: Ecce tibi est exortus Isocrates, magister istorum omnium, cuius e ludo tamquam ex equo Troiano meri principes exierunt.

De Orat., III, 9, 36: . . . Isocrates, doctor singularis. . . .

De Orat., III, 35, 141: Itaque ipse Aristoteles cum florere Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret, . . . mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinae. Cf. Tusc. Disp., I, 4, 7.

Brutus, 8, 32: . . . Isocrates, cuius domus cunctae Graeciae quasi ludus quidam patuit atque officina dicendi; magnus orator et perfectus magister, quamquam forensi luce caruit intraque parietes aluit eam gloriam, quam nemo meo quidem iudicio est postea consecutus.

Orator, 13, 40: Horum aetati successit Isocrates, qui praeter ceteros eiusdem generis laudatur semper a nobis.

Orator, 13, 42: . . . me autem qui Isocraten non diligunt una cum Socrate et cum Platone errare patiantur.

¹ Cf. Ammon in B. ph. W., 1909, 1396.

² It is quite probable that the more specific formulation of parts may be adapted or derived from later Greek rhetoricians.

I shall next give the passages in which Cicero quotes from Isocrates, mentioning Isocrates by name and giving the title of the work quoted:

Orator, 11, 37: Sed quoniam plura sunt orationum genera eaque diversa neque in unam formam cadunt omnia, laudationum [scriptionum et historiarum] et talium suasionum, qualem Isocrates fecit Panegyricum, . . . reliquarumque rerum formam, quae absunt a forensi contentione . . . non complectar hoc tempore.

Orator, 12, 38: In Panathenaico autem Isocrates ea se studiose consecratum fatetur; non enim ad iudiciorum certamen, sed ad voluptatem aurium scripserat. Cf. Isoc. Panath., 1, 2.

Orator, 52, 176: Quin etiam se ipse tantum quantum aetate procedebat—prope enim centum confecit annos—relaxarat a nimia necessitate numerorum, quod declarat in eo libro quem ad Philippum Macedonem scripsit, cum iam admodum esset senex; in quo dicit sese minus iam servire numeris quam solitus esset. Cf. Isoc. Phil., 27.

Cato Maj., 5, 13: Isocratis, qui eum librum, qui Panathenaicus inscribitur, quarto et nonagesimo anno scripsisse se dicit vixitque quinquennium postea. Cf. Isoc. Panath., 3.

There is a probable reference to Isocrates in Rep., III, 30, 42: Duas sibi res, quominus in vulgus et in foro diceret, confidentiam et vocem, defuisse (dixit). Cf. Isoc. Panath., 10; Phil., 81.

These passages, to be sure, may be quotations from later authors, but if we consider them together with the passages cited above in which Cicero plainly states his admiration for Isocrates, we have more than a mere probability that Cicero was drawing directly from Isocrates when he wrote the *De Oratore*. I now turn to a detailed examination of this treatise.

Cicero sets up in the *De Oratore* a theory of oratory which he contrasts with two opinions commonly held in his day. It is not my purpose to discuss in this place the various theories

that have been proposed regarding the identity of the schools thus attacked, nor even the question whether the *De Oratore* is to be regarded at all as a polemic. Whatever may be the truth on this point, it is evident that he is dissatisfied with two views; the first, that the orator should be restricted to practice in the law courts, and that all the larger questions of politics and ethics are material for the philosopher alone;¹ the second, that rhetoric without philosophy is sufficient training for a man who is to enter public life.²

In contrast to these views Cicero proposes the widest possible range for the orator's activity. *Illa vis autem eloquentiae tanta est, ut omnium rerum virtutum officiorum omnisque naturae quae mores hominum, quae animos, quae vitam continet, originem vim mutationesque teneat, eadem mores leges iura describat, rem publicam regat, omnia, quae ad quamcumque rem pertineant, orate copioseque dicat.*³

This was the practice of ancient orators and rhetoricians.⁴ The activity here referred to falls naturally into two classes. Scaevola, summing up Crassus' argument, says: *sed illa duo, Crasse, vereor ut tibi possim concedere: unum, quod ab oratoribus civitates et initio constitutas et saepe conservatas esse dixisti, alterum quod remoto foro contione iudiciis senatu statuisti oratorem in omni genere sermonis et humanitatis esse perfectum.*⁵ To the first Cicero devotes the most attention. The orator is to be the leader in the state;⁶ to him falls the responsibility and noble privilege of using this, the greatest of nature's gifts, in guiding the thoughts of the senate and the passions of the mob.⁷

But it is plain that for the full development of the orator

¹ III, 19, 70; I, 11, 46.

² III, 24, 93. See passages collected by Schlittenbauer in *Fleck. Jahrb. Suppl.*, xxviii (1903), p. 192, n. 3.

³ III, 20, 76. Cf. III, 14, 54; I, 49, 214.

⁴ III, 32, 126; III, 19, 72.

⁵ I, 9, 35.

⁶ III, 17, 63; III, 31, 122.

⁷ I, 8, 31-34.

more is needed than a training in a school of rhetoric. *Doctrina recte faciendi* cannot be separated from *doctrina bene dicendi*.¹ Any such separation as was made by Socrates inevitably weakens both the orator and the philosopher.² The ordinary orator can outwit a philosopher in a debate on the philosopher's own field, but if any one should combine a training in philosophy with rhetorical training, *is sit verus, is perfectus, is solus orator*.³ And aside from its utility in political life, oratory produces more pleasure than any other accomplishment.⁴

This, in brief, is Cicero's ideal of an orator. I shall now examine the details of his argument and point out the resemblances to Isocrates which it reveals.

Cicero claims for the orator the ability to speak on every subject. This is best set forth in *De Oratore*, III, 20, 76:

Illa vis autem eloquentiae tanta est, ut omnium rerum virtutum officiorum omnisque naturae, quae mores hominum, quae animos, quae vitam continet, originem vim mutationesque teneat, eadem mores leges iura describat, rem publicam regat, omnia, quae ad quamcumque rem pertineant, ornate copioseque dicat.

Cf. also I, 13, 59: . . . oratorem plenum atque perfectum esse eum, qui de omnibus rebus possit copiose varieque dicere.

I, 49, 213: Crassus . . . mihi visus est omnem omnium rerum atque artium scientiam comprehendere uno oratoris officio ac nomine.

II, 2, 5: . . . bene dicere, quod est scienter et perite et ornate dicere non habet definitam aliquam regionem, cuius terminis saepta teneatur. Omnia, quaecumque in hominum disceptationem cadere possunt, bene sunt ei dicenda qui hoc se posse profitetur, aut eloquentiae nomen relinquendum est.

III, 27, 107: De virtute enim, de officio, de aequo et bono,

¹ III, 15, 58. Cf. III, 35, 141 f.

² III, 19, 72.

³ III, 21, 80. III, 30, 121 — 31, 123.

⁴ II, 8, 34 ff. I, 8, 31.

de dignitate utilitate honore ignominia praemio poena similibusque de rebus in utramque partem dicendi animos et vim et artem habere debemus. (108) Sed quoniam de nostra possessione depulsi in parvo et eo litigioso praediolo relictis sumus et aliorum patroni nostra tenere tuerique non potuimus, ab iis, quod indignissimum est, qui in nostrum patrimonium irruerunt, quod opus est nobis mutuemur.

To attain this result the orator must add to his training in rhetoric a wide knowledge, which he can obtain only from the philosopher.

De Orat., I, 5, 17: Est enim et scientia comprehendenda rerum plurimarum.

I, 6, 20: Ac mea quidem sententia nemo potuit esse omni laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus. Et enim ex rerum cognitione ecflorescat et redundet oportet oratio; quae nisi subest res ab oratore percepta et cognita, inanem quandam habet elocutionem et paene puerilem.

I, 16, 72: . . . sic sentio, neminem esse in oratorum numero habendum, qui non sit omnibus iis artibus, quae sunt libero dignae, perpolitus. . . .

II, 1, 5: . . . illud autem est huius institutae scriptionis ac temporis, neminem eloquentia non modo sine dicendi doctrina sed ne sine omni quidem sapientia florere unquam et praestare potuisse.

II, 16, 68: Equidem omnia, quae pertinent ad usum civium, morem hominum, quae versantur in consuetudine vitae, in ratione rei publicae, in hac societate civili, in sensu hominis communi, in natura, in moribus comprehendenda esse oratori puto.

III, 30, 121: Non enim solum acuenda nobis neque procudenda lingua est, sed onerandum complendumque pectus maximarum rerum et plurimarum suavitate, copia, varietate. Nostrast enim—si modo nos oratores, si in civium disceptationibus, si in periculis, si in deliberationibus publicis

adhibendi auctores et principes sumus —, nostrast, inquam, omnis ista prudentiae doctrinaeque possessio, in quam homines quasi caducam atque vacuum abundantes otio nobis occupatis involaverunt atque etiam aut inidentes oratorem, ut ille in Gorgia Socrates, cavillantur aut aliquid de oratoris arte paucis praecipiant libellis eosque rhetoricos inscribunt, quasi non illa sint propria rhetorum, quae ab eisdem de iustitia, de officio, de civitatibus instituendis et regendis, de omni vivendi, denique etiam de naturae ratione dicuntur.

Cf. also Orator, 4, 14-16; 32, 113 — 34, 121.

We have Cicero's own statement to prove that this view of the universality of the orator's field was held by Isocrates.

De Orat., III, 19, 72: Namque, ut ante dixi, veteres illi usque ad Socratem omnem omnium rerum, quae ad mores hominum, quae ad vitam, quae ad virtutem, quae ad rem publicam pertinebant, cognitionem et scientiam cum dicendi ratione iungebant. The *veteres illi usque ad Socratem* include Isocrates as will be seen by comparing III, 16, 59: Sed quod erant quidam iique multi, qui aut in re publica propter ancipitem, quae non potest esse seiuncta, faciendi dicendique sapientiam florerent, ut Themistocles, ut Pericles, ut Thera-
menes, aut qui minus ipsi in re publica versarentur, sed ut huius tamen eiusdem sapientiae doctores essent, ut Gorgias Thrasymachus Isocrates, inventi sunt qui, cum ipsi doctrina et ingeniis abundarent, a re autem civili et a negotiis animi quodam iudicio abhorrerent, hanc dicendi exercitationem exagitarent atque contemnerent; quorum princeps Socrates fuit.

Isocrates, then, was one of those who combined with oratory the study of philosophy, call it *doctrina recte faciendi* (57), or *vivendi* (57), or *faciendi sapientiam* (59), or *sapienter sentiendi* . . . *scientiam* (60), which was made a separate pursuit by Socrates and by all his successors from Plato to Carneades, and which Cicero now wishes to restore to its former connection with rhetoric.

Where in the works of Isocrates did Cicero find this doctrine expounded? We should not expect to find such emphasis laid upon the necessity of knowledge by Isocrates as by Cicero. For the two, while defending the same position, are defending it against attacks from two entirely different enemies. Both hold that philosophy and rhetoric are united by nature. But Isocrates is opposing those who reject rhetoric altogether and substitute other pursuits, hence he emphasizes the value of *λέγειν*; while Cicero in these passages is opposing the *rhetores* who refused to admit that philosophy had any relation to rhetoric, hence he is emphasizing here the necessity of a wide knowledge if one would attain success as an orator.

Accordingly we shall find that Isocrates makes two divisions of the orator's training, but does not emphasize the necessity of universal knowledge. In a passage in the treatise *Κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν* he gives a brief outline of his course. The first step is (16) *τῶν μὲν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἀπαντας καὶ λέγομεν καὶ συντίθεμεν, λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην*. Then follow the various steps of *rhetorical* training in the narrower sense of the word:

τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ὥς δεῖ προελεῖσθαι καὶ μῖξαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξαι κατὰ τρόπον, ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ὄλον τὸν λόγον καταποικίλαι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν. (Cf. *Ant.*, 183 ff.)

That Isocrates means by *ἰδέαι* the knowledge of various subjects which an orator should possess, we have shown above (p. 6 ff.). This passage forms a close parallel to Cicero, *De Orat.*, I, 5, 17 f. In the latter passage we have the same division that we find in Isocrates,—a few lines devoted to *scientia*, followed by two sections on the rhetorical training of the orator. Another point of similarity is the position of the passages. Each forms the climax of the introduction to the speech in which it stands; each is intended as a complete, though succinct, exposition of the training of an orator to

which the treatise is devoted. With this in mind we may well believe that Cicero had the passage from Isocrates in mind when he wrote *De Orat.*, I, 5, 17.

The objection may be made that while Isocrates considers knowledge as necessary for an orator, he nowhere emphasizes the necessity for an acquaintance with all the fields of knowledge as Cicero does. This difference is due to the over-emphasis by Cicero, rather than neglect on the part of Isocrates. For Isocrates, standing at the end of a long line of orators who combined practical statesmanship with oratory (*De Orat.*, III, 16, 59), and living before the period of separation of rhetoric from philosophy, does not feel the same need that Cicero feels for laying stress on the multitude of things an orator must know. To him it is a matter to be taken for granted that the orator must cover a wide field. Accordingly we shall find that Isocrates did in practice claim to have the *scientia rerum plurimarum*, although in his theory he does not pay so much attention to this point as Cicero does. Thus, aside from his forensic speeches, Isocrates frequently treats of the principles of statesmanship, as, for example, in the letter to Nicocles, 2, 6, 9, 16. The body of this letter is devoted to political maxims—an example of the *lêtai*. The treatise entitled *Nicocles* deals with the duties of a citizen. *Evagoras*, 41-46, is a statement of Isocrates' political views under the guise of an encomium of Evagoras. In the *Panathenaicus*, 108-150, we find a discussion of the value of the different forms of government. In addition to these passages we have his statement that he taught the management of *τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως* (*Ant.*, 285, cf. 99). This can be illustrated by his speeches on current political questions: those dealing with foreign relations, the *Panegyricus*, particularly §§ 1-5, 15-20, 85-90, and the *Philippus*; those dealing with the relations between Greek states, *Plataicus*, *De Pace*, *Archidamus*; and the *Areopagiticus*, relating to political questions of purely local interest at Athens.

Isocrates also treats of the principles of warfare. See the recital of the virtues of Timotheus (Ant., 107 ff.), into which he has worked such knowledge as he would have imparted to a student of oratory. Compare also the modest disclaimer in Philippus, 105.

Isocrates professes to teach also the management of one's private affairs (*τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον διοικεῖν* Ant., 285; cf. 99) and the ethical principles which one must put into practice in private life. Under this latter heading we have in Panath., 30-32, the general statement of the virtues that an educated man possesses, and if we accept the work entitled "Demonicus" as genuine, we have precepts on the relations to one's friends (Dem., 15, 24-27, 33, 41, 42), relation to parents (14), observance of the formalities of religion (13), on demeanor in society (15, 41, 42), on the necessity of physical exercise (14, 40). In addition to this varied activity, he is, naturally enough, a literary critic. (Bus., 1-9; Hel., 1-15.)

This list will serve to recall the fact that Isocrates did not limit himself in the choice of subject matter. In this it corresponds exactly to the ideal presented by Cicero.

Cicero is careful to warn against spending too much time on philosophy. The orator must go to the philosopher in search of that learning which is by right his own, but of which he has been robbed by Socrates and his successors. But he need not be terrified by the apparently enormous mass of material to be assimilated. For the orator can learn in a short time all that is necessary. It is only the professional philosopher who spends all his life in philosophy. The following passages present this view:

De Orat., III, 23, 86: *Ac, si quaeris, Catule, de doctrina ista quid ego sentiam, non tantum ingenioso homini et ei, qui forum, qui curiam, qui causas, qui rem publicam spectet, opus esse arbitror temporis, quantum sibi ii sumpserunt, quos discentes vita defecit.*

Ibid., III, 23, 87: Ista discuntur facile, si et tantum sumas, quantum opus sit, et habeas qui docere fideliter possit et scias etiam ipse discere.

Ibid., III, 23, 88: Ita fit, ut agitatio^{ne} rerum sit infinita, cognitio facilis; usus doctrinam confirmet, mediocris opera tribuatur, memoria studiumque permaneat. Libet autem semper discere.

Ibid., III, 23, 89: Res quidem se mea sententia sic habet, ut, nisi quod quisque cito potuerit, numquam omnino possit perdiscere.

Ibid., III, 31, 123: Quae quoniam iam aliunde non possumus, sumenda sunt nobis ab iis ipsis, a quibus expilati sumus; dummodo illa ad hanc civilem scientiam, quo pertinent et quam intuentur, transferamus neque, ut ante dixi, omnem teramus in iis discendis rebus aetatem; sed cum fontis viderimus, quos nisi qui celeriter cognorit, numquam cognoscet omnino, tum, quotiensquomque opus erit, ex iis tantum, quantum res petet, hauriemus. Nam neque tam est acris acies in naturis hominum et ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam nisi monstratas possit videre, neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas, ut eas non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo aspexerit.

Compare also De Orat., II, 27, 120; III, 36, 145. Cicero applies his doctrine in explaining the qualifications that an orator must possess. (De Orat., I, 5, 17 ff.) As we have seen above, he devotes two lines to *scientia*, and twenty to the purely rhetorical side of oratory.

This view of the ease with which one may acquire the necessary training in philosophy is drawn from Isocrates. In the speech *Κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν*, 16, we have these words: *φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἀπαντας καὶ λέγομεν καὶ συντίθεμεν, λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐκ εἶναι τῶν πάντων χαλεπῶν, ἣν τις αὐτὸν παραδῶ μὴ τοῖς ῥαδίως ὑπισχνουμένοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι τι περὶ αὐτῶν.* Here we have a statement not only of the ease of learning, but of the necessity for proper teaching, corre-

sponding to Cicero's *si . . . habeas qui docere fideliter possit* (De Orat., III, 23, 87). The third point in Cicero, *si . . . scias ipse discere* is given by Isocrates in a passage in the Antidosis parallel in general to this passage in the Speech Against the Sophists. Ant., 189: τὸν γὰρ ἔχοντα τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν εὐρεῖν καὶ μαθεῖν καὶ πονῆσαι καὶ μνημονεῦσαι δυναμένην.

There is a striking passage in Isocrates in which he ascribes the rise of civilization to the power of speech and the ability to persuade. In Nic., 5 ff. (= Ant., 253 ff.), Isocrates sets forth the advantages of oratory:

τοῖς γὰρ ἅλλοις οἷς ἔχομεν οὐδὲν τῶν ζώων διαφέρομεν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ τῷ τάχει καὶ τῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις εὐπορίαις καταδεέστεροι τυγχάνομεν ὄντες.

This idea is adopted by Cicero in the De Orat., I, 8, 32: Hoc enim uno praestamus vel maxime feris, quod colloquimur inter nos et quod exprimere dicendo sensa possumus. Quam ob rem quis hoc non iure miretur summeque in eo elaborandum esse arbitretur, ut, quo uno homines maxime bestiis praestent, in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat?

Nic., 6 (= Ant., 254): ἐγγενομένου δ' ἡμῖν τοῦ πείθειν ἀλλήλους καὶ δηλοῦν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, περὶ ὧν ἂν βουλευθῶμεν, οὐ μόνον τοῦ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγημεν ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες πόλεις ὥκισαμεν καὶ νόμους ἐθέμεθα καὶ τέχνας εὐρομεν, καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ δι' ἡμῶν μεμηχανημένα λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὁ συγκατασκευάσας. οὗτος γὰρ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ἐνομοθέτησεν. ὧν μὴ διαταχθέντων οὐκ ἂν οἶοι τ' ἡμεῖς οἰκεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων.

Cf. De Orat., I, 8, 33: ut vero iam ad illa summa veniamus, quae vis alia potuit aut dispersos homines unum in locum congregare aut a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum civilemque deducere, aut iam constitutis civitatibus leges iudicia iura describere?

Cf. De Inv., I, 2, 2 f., especially *rationem atque orationem* (2),

and sec. 3: Age vero, urbibus constitutis, ut fidem colere et iustitiam retinere discerent et aliis parere sua voluntate conuescerent ac non modo labores excipiendos communis commodi causa, sed etiam vitam amittendam existimarent: qui tandem fieri potuit, nisi homines ea, quae ratione invenissent, *eloquentia* persuadere potuissent?

The union of *ratio et oratio* (De Inv.) which expresses in different words the idea *perfecti oratoris moderatio et sapientia* (De Orat., I, 8, 34) corresponds to the union of *φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν* which is common in Isocrates (Paneg., 50; Ant., 207, 277, 293, 294, 308) although not mentioned in this passage in just this form, but hinted at in *τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὥς δεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν εἰς μέγιστον σημεῖον ποιούμεθα* (Nicocles, 7).¹

As bearing on the general question of the influence of Isocrates on Cicero, it is interesting to note the relative importance that these passages bear to the rest of the works in which they stand. In Cicero, both in the De Inventione and in the De Oratore the passage quoted stands at the beginning of the discussion, and in the De Oratore it strikes the keynote of the whole treatise; in Isocrates the passage is so definitely a part of his system that he repeats it verbatim in the Antidosis, § 253 ff.; and gives us the same thought in different words in Paneg., 48 ff.²

¹ There is also a similar ring to the conclusions of the paragraphs in the two authors. Isoc. Nicocles, 9: *εἰ δὲ δεῖ συλλήβδην κτλ*; Cic., De Orat., I, 8, 34: *Ac ne plura, etc.*

² Cicero sums up the praise of oratory at the beginning of Scaevola's reply (I, 9, 35): *unum quod ab oratoribus civitates et initio constitutas et saepe conservatas esse dixisti, alterum, quod remoto foro contione iudiciis senatu statuisti oratorem in omni genere sermonis et humanitatis esse perfectum. Cf. 32 f.*

The latter point, general perfection in all intercourse and culture, is not treated by Isocrates in the passages quoted above, but is given in his definition of an educated man, Panath., 26 ff. Here four points are mentioned as essential: (1) practical ability, (2) social propriety, (3) self-control in the presence of pleasure and disaster, (4) moderation, lack of false pride, *εἰ φρονεῖν*. The second point I give in full as it affords a parallel to the passage from Cicero quoted above. Panath., 31: *τοὺς πρεπόντως*

An attempt has been made by Philippson (in *Fleck. Jahrbücher*, 133 (1886), p. 418) supported by Norden (*Fleck. Jahrb. Suppl.*, XIX (1893), p. 427) and Kroll (*Rh. Mus.*, 58 (1903), p. 518) to assign Posidonius as a source for Cicero's *De Orat.*, I, 8, 33 and 36; *De Inv.*, I, 2, 2 f.; *Tusc. D.*, I, 25, 62 ff.; V, 2, 5 ff. Philippson bases his argument on the resemblance between the passages in Cicero and the opening sections (1-6) of Seneca, *Ep.* 90. Seneca is confessedly following Posidonius,¹ in ascribing the blessings of civilization to *philosophia*. And there is a striking resemblance between the passage in Seneca and the two passages in the *Tusculan Disputations*. It may be quite possible that Cicero in writing these words in the *Tusculans*, had in mind the doctrine of Posidonius. But when we come to consider the other passages from Cicero, viz., *De Inv.*, I, 2, 2, and *De Orat.*, I, 8, 33, I, 8, 36, we find that *eloquentia* (*De Inv.*, I, 2, 3) or as it is expressed in the *De Oratore* (I, 8, 34) *perfecti oratoris moderatio et sapientia* is given as the civilizing force. In order to account for this discrepancy, Philippson resorts to the Stoic principles of Posidonius, in accordance with which *eloquentia* was one of the virtues, and the *sapiens* who possesses one virtue possesses them all, and therefore possesses *eloquentia*. But it is improbable that a Stoic laid such emphasis on oratory as Cicero does, and in the absence of any mention of it in the passage from Seneca we must acknowledge that Philippson's identification of Posidonius as a source for the *De Oratore* and *De Inventione* is scarcely justified.² It would be much

καὶ δικαίως ὁμιλοῦντας τοῖς ἀεὶ πλησιάζουσι, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ ῥαδίως φέροντας, σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ὡς δύνατον ἐλαφροτάτους καὶ μετριωτάτους τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας.

¹ *Ep.*, 90, 7: hactenus Posidonio adsentior.

² Cf. the disparaging opinion of this kind of oratory in *De Orat.*, I, 18, 83; II, 38, 159; cf. *Brut.*, 118. *De Orat.*, III, 18, 65, and I, 18, 83, would seem to support Philippson's view. In both these passages Cicero commends the Stoics for considering eloquence as a virtue, and in I, 18, 83, he distinctly says that the Stoics considered eloquentiam . . . unam quandam esse virtutem et qui unam virtutem haberet, omnis habere easque

more natural to attribute those two views of the origin of civilization to two different sources. In the Tusculan Disputations, where Cicero is writing from the point of view of a philosopher, he may have followed Posidonius. But the source of the corresponding passages in the oratorical works must be sought elsewhere. We have such a source in Isocrates.

It is interesting to note, however, that in T. D., V, 3, 8, it is said that Leon admired the *ingenium et eloquentiam* of Pythagoras. This is the only time that *eloquentia* is mentioned in this passage. The passage is designed to praise philosophy, but Cicero cannot repress his admiration for rhetoric. Note also that Pythagoras is accepted by Isocrates as one of his ideals (Bus., 28).¹

Cicero recurs again and again to his ideal of the union of *esse inter se aequalis et par*; ita, qui esset eloquens, eum virtutes omnes habere atque esse sapientem. But in III, 18, 65, he rejects the Stoic philosophy as inconsistent with good rhetorical practice; the only good he can see in the Stoics is that, owing to the peculiarities of their system, *eloquentia* = *sapientia*,—a view which was Cicero's own. However the resemblance between Cicero and the Stoics is merely in words. If we compare Cicero's other expressions about the Stoic rhetoric we find that in his judgment the Stoic formula really meant, "Stoic rhetoric" (*i. e.*, *spinosa quaedam et exilis oratio longeque ab nostris sensibus abhorrens*, I, 18, 83) = "Stoic philosophy" (a peculiar doctrine at variance with the common sense of mankind, III, 18, 66). We see, too, from I, 18, 83, that the Stoics rejected a definition of an orator which would satisfy Cicero (*ipse Mnesarchus, hos, quos nos oratores vocaremus, nihil esse dicebat nisi quosdam operarios lingua celeri et exercitata*) and held that the only true orator was the *sapiens*, *i. e.*, a Stoic philosopher. Moreover in I, 11, 46, we find that the philosophers, Stoics included, denied the right of the orator to any part of the field of philosophy, that is, they opposed one of the main points of Cicero's rhetorical theory. It is clear that we must seek for the sources of the *De Oratore* not among the philosophers but among the rhetoricians.

¹ For a similar theory of the origin of society originating with Democritus and continued by a series of philosophers see Reinhart in *Hermes*, XLVII (1912). Dickerman (*De Argumentis quibusdam e structura hominis et animalium petitis*, p. 32) compares Cic. *De Orat.*, I, 8, 32, with Isoc. *Nic.*, 5 and Aristot. *Pol.*, 1253a, 10 and other places where the inferiority of man to animals is noticed. In none of these passages, however, is the parallel to Cicero so close as in Isocrates.

the orator and the statesman in one person. This is to him the natural condition. Thus in the early periods of Greek history no one thought of making a division between oratory and political philosophy. (De Orat., III, 34, 137 ff.; III, 15, 57-60.) Socrates (III, 16, 59 f.) was the first to separate oratory and philosophy, and to devote himself to the latter to the exclusion of the former. Since the time of Socrates there has been a constant strife between the supporters of rhetoric and the supporters of the narrow Socratic view of philosophy, with the result that both orator and philosopher have suffered from want of that perfect union which should exist between them (De Orat., III, 19, 72). Cicero includes Isocrates among those who represented his ideal (III, 16, 59). It is clear also from the passages quoted above that Isocrates advocated exactly the same union of philosopher and statesman that Cicero does. The general similarity between the principles of the two orators is therefore plain; we may now look for passages in Cicero which point to Isocrates as the source from which Cicero drew his ideal.

Isocrates in Ant., 230-236, supports his view that orators make the best statesmen by appealing to Athenian history. He enumerates Solon, Clisthenes, Themistocles and Pericles, men who are acknowledged to have been the greatest benefactors of Athens, and shows that each was a great orator as well as a great statesman, and that without the gift of oratory they would have been powerless to benefit their country. He repeats the thought in Ant., 306-308, this time describing, without mentioning names, Clisthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles and Pericles. (Cf. also 313.)

It is difficult for Isocrates to find evidence on which to base his claim that all these men were orators in the Isocratean meaning of the word. About Pericles there is no doubt, and Isocrates comes out boldly with *δημαγωγὸς ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἀριστος* (234). But in regard to Themistocles he is reduced to an argument from probability: . . . *ὁ τίς ἂν οἶός τ' ἐγένετο*

πεῖσαι μὴ πολὺ τῷ λόγῳ διενεγκῶν (233); Clisthenes is claimed as an orator on the strength of the phrase λόγῳ πείσας τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας (232), which cannot except by the most barefaced sophistry be twisted into meaning that he was a professional orator after the manner of Isocrates. Solon is claimed by a similar play on the word σοφιστής (235; cf. 313). In the second passage (306-308) the examples are treated collectively in the words εὐρήσετε γὰρ, ἣν ἐξετάζητε τούτων ἕκαστον, . . . διαφέροντας καὶ προέχοντας . . . τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν (308), where the promise εὐρήσετε covers Isocrates' lack of evidence.

This line of argument is adopted by Cicero in the *De Oratore*. In a digression (III, 56-61) on the relation of rhetoric to philosophy, he twice names Greek statesmen as possessing *ancipitem, quae non potest esse seiuncta, faciendi dicendique sapientiam* (III, 16, 59). The statesmen mentioned are Lycurgus, Pittacus, Solon (56), Themistocles, Pericles, Theramenes (59), and parallel to these is a list of Romans, Coruncanius, Fabricius, Cato, Scipio (56). The list does not correspond exactly to Isocrates' list, nor was it to be expected that, quoting from memory, Cicero would take the same examples that Isocrates uses. The more essential point of similarity is that Cicero adopts from Isocrates the form of the argument with all its inconsistencies. He recognizes the difficulty which presents itself to anyone who attempts to prove that oratory was part of the equipment of the Roman heroes,¹ but contents himself with a reaffirmation of his belief that they were orators (I, 13, 58).

Thus we have seen Isocrates claiming Athenian heroes as orators on grounds of barest probability and Cicero following him with a similar list of orators about whom he uses exactly

¹ I, 9, 37 (Antonius objects to Crassus' view of the value of oratory): Quid? in Numa Pompilio, quid? in Servio Tullio, quid? in ceteris regibus, quorum multa sunt eximia ad constituendam rem publicam, num eloquentiae vestigium apparet? Quid? exactis regibus, tametsi ipsam exactionem mente, non lingua perfectam L. Bruti esse cernimus, sed deinceps omnia nonne plena consiliorum, inania verborum videmus?

the same line of argument that Isocrates uses. He then adapts this to Roman oratory and makes similar claims on the basis of similar evidence in regard to them. This parallelism between Isocrates and Cicero leads us to the conclusion that Cicero is using Isocrates as his authority.

This view is strengthened if we contrast other treatments of the history of oratory, *e. g.*, Quintilian (Inst. Orat., X, 1, 76 ff.; cf. III, 1, 12) gives a wholly orthodox list of orators. He does not include even Pericles.

In other writers we find a varied treatment of the oratorical ability of these men, according as the author inclines to one side or the other of the conflict between rhetoric and philosophy. Plutarch, to be sure, relates the story about Themistocles' composing and rehearsing speeches while the other boys were playing.¹ But in the same chapter he goes out of his way to deny the influences of rhetoric on Themistocles. After denying the statement of Stesimbrotus that Themistocles had studied with Anaxagoras, he proceeds to form a school for Mnesiphilus² whom he makes the master of Themistocles. Mnesiphilus, according to Plutarch, was not a *ρήτωρ*, nor a *φυσικός φιλόσοφος*, but a teacher of the wisdom, so-called, which was skill in politics and practical sagacity. In this he was the successor of Solon. His successors associated it with the forensic arts and transferred their sphere of activity from public affairs to speaking. These were called sophists.³ Now, whether Mnesiphilus is an invention of the detractors of Themistocles, as Macan thinks,⁴ or an actual

¹ Plut. Themistocles, II (112).

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personage, the purpose of Plutarch in this passage is plain. He is emphasizing the point that Themistocles was free from the influence of the rhetoricians. The statement that the connection between πολιτική δεινότης and λόγοι was not made until after the time of Themistocles could not have come from an author like Cicero who was following Isocrates.

The attempt to claim Themistocles as the product of some school was a very old one, and probably antedated Isocrates.¹ At least Thucydides seems to have some such story in mind in the tribute to Themistocles in I, 138. He emphasizes the natural ability of Themistocles (οἰκεία ξυνέσει—φύσεως δυνάμει), apparently with the intention of refuting the slanders of Stesimbrotus. The same question is raised in Xenophon's Memorabilia (IV, 2, 2): πυρθανομένου τινὸς πότερον Θεμιστοκλῆς διὰ συνουσίαν τινὸς τῶν σοφῶν ἢ φύσει τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε τῶν πολιτῶν. . . .

But it would be apart from my main purpose to pursue this point any further. More important for the particular subject in hand is the fact that Thucydides in his summary of the virtues of Themistocles makes no mention of his oratorical ability. Similarly in Xen. Mem., II, 6, 13, Themistocles is contrasted with Pericles, and the possession of wonderful oratory is denied him.² In the Symposium Themistocles, Pericles and Solon are noticed but without mention of λόγος.³

These passages from Quintilian, Plutarch, Thucydides and Xenophon serve to show the way Themistocles was regarded by a writer not an Isocratean. I shall now give some examples to show the influence of the views of Isocrates.

¹ The stories may have started with Stesimbrotus (v. Perrin, pp. 32, 33) and have been attempts to malign him, but the intent of such accounts as that furnished by Plutarch is quite different.

² " . . . ἤκουσα μὲν ὅτι Περικλῆς πολλὰς ἐπίσταται, ὥς ἐπῆδον τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὐτόν." "Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ πῶς ἐποίησε τὴν πόλιν φιλεῖν αὐτόν;" "Μὰ Δὲ! οὐκ ἐπῆδον, ἀλλὰ περιάψας τί ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ."

³ Xen. Symp., VIII, 39: . . . σκεπτόν μὲν σοι ποῖα ἐπιστάμενος Θεμιστοκλῆς ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν, σκεπτόν δὲ ποῖα ποτε εἰδὼς Περικλῆς κράτιστος ἔδοκει τῇ πατρίδι σύμβουλος εἶναι, ἀβρητὸν δὲ καὶ πῶς ποτε Σόλων φιλοσοφῆσας νόμους κρατίστους τῇ πόλει κατέθηκεν. . . .

The *Oratio Funebris* ascribed to Lysias is generally acknowledged to be spurious. Blass¹ recognizes a close relation between it and the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates. It is not surprising, then, to find an additional resemblance between the judgment of the *Ps. Lysias* on Themistocles, and that expressed by Isocrates. [*Lys.*] II, 42: *Θεμιστοκλέα, ικανώτατον εἰπεῖν καὶ γινῶναι καὶ πράξει* (= rhetoric, philosophy, statesmanship).

Nicolaus Sophista is very clearly following the Isocratean view in his *Encomium Themistoclis*. *W.*, I, 338: *εἰ μὲν οὖν Θεμιστοκλῆς μόνα κατορβοῦν τὰ πολέμου δεινός, λόγῳ δὲ μὴ καθειστήκει δεινότερος, οὐδὲν ἂν προὔργου ἦν τὰ Θεμιστοκλέους διεξελθεῖν· νῦν δὲ τὰ ἐν καιρῷ κομίζεται τὸν ἔπαινον, ἐπίσης ὅπλα μελετήσας καὶ λόγους.*

And at the end of the *Encomium*, *W.*, I, 340: *ἦν πάντα ἡμῖν τὰ Θεμιστοκλέους διεξελθεῖν, εἰ λόγων ἰσχύς κατὰ Θεμιστοκλέα παρῆν.*

Maximus Planudes includes Themistocles and Miltiades in a list of orator-statesmen. *W.*, V, 214: *πέντε εἰσὶ ρητορικαί, μία μὲν ἡ πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ἡ ἀντίστροφος τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἣ ἐχρήσατο Πυθαγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων, . . . δευτέρα ἡ ἀντίστροφος τῇ πολιτικῇ ἣς ἡγήσαντο Μιλτιάδης καὶ Κίμων καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς· οὗτοι γὰρ μὴδὲν συγγραφόμενοι ἐπολιτεύοντο.* Cf. a similar statement in *Doxapater*, *Prol. ad Rhet.*, *W.*, VI, 24. We have much the same statement in *Sopater*, *Prol. ad Aristid.* (ed. Jebb., vol. I) *τρῆς φορὰς ρητόρων γεγόνασιν· ὧν ἡ μὲν πρώτη ἀγράφως ἔληγεν, ἥς ἐστι Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Περικλῆς καὶ οἱ κατ' ἐκείνους ῥήτορες.*

I have selected Themistocles for this detailed treatment because he alone of the statesmen mentioned by Isocrates is noticed by other writers in such a way as to afford a satisfactory comparison. So far as I have observed, no writers

¹ *Attische Beredsamkeit*, I², pp. 438-447. According to Wilamowitz (*Hermes*, 35 (1900), p. 30) the oration was inserted in the Lysianic corpus about the beginning of the third century.

notice oratorical ability in Solon or Clisthenes.¹ An interesting parallel to Isocrates' list of statesmen-orators is afforded us by Plato in the *Gorgias* (503 ff.). After Socrates has gained from Callicles the admission that there are two kinds of rhetoric, one mere flattery (*κολακευα ἢν εἴη καὶ αἰσχροὶ δημηγορία*), the other noble (*τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί*), he asks Callicles to name an example of the latter kind of rhetoric. Callicles knows of no contemporaneous *ρήτωρ* who satisfies the conditions, but claims that Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles possessed the noble rhetoric (503 c: ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουνόνι τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὐ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας; 515 c: ΣΩ. . . . εἰπέ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγω πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε). Socrates then shows that the citizens were worse when these statesmen retired from public life than when they entered it, moreover that Themistocles, Cimon and Miltiades had suffered at the hands of the populace they tried to control. Consequently they possessed neither the noble nor the flattering rhetoric. (517 a: εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.) A more complete negation of Isocrates' theories it would be hard to find. Plato not only denies that the statesmen possessed any *ρητορικὴ*, but ascribes the corruption of Athens to the men whom Isocrates makes her greatest heroes. It is highly probable that Isocrates had this attack of Plato's in his mind when he wrote the passages in the *Antidosis* dealing with these statesmen.²

Both writers speak of the value of oratory in promoting good

¹ Plutarch (Cimon, 4) and Nepos (Cimon, 2, 1) imply that Cimon was not distinguished as an orator.

² Cf. Nestle in *Philologus*, LXX (= XXIV), 1911, p. 11. For the discussion of these men in Aristides, v. Chap. 4.

morals. Isocrates, Ant., 255: τούτῳ (i. e., λόγῳ), καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐγκωμιάζομεν. διὰ τούτου τοὺς τ' ἀνοήτους παιδεύομεν καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δοκιμάζομεν.

Similarly Cicero, De Orat., II, 9, 35: Quis cohortari ad virtutem ardentius, quis a vitiis acrius revocare, quis *virtutem improbos* asperius, quis *laudare bonos* ornatius . . . potest?

Isocrates, Ant., 60: ἐνθυμήθητε δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς, εἰ δοκῶ τοῖς λόγοις διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους ἀλλὰ μὴ προτρέπειν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν. . . .

Ant., 67: . . . πάντες οἱ λόγοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην συντείνουσιν.

Ant., 84: Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην προσποιουμένων προτρέπειν ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀληθέστεροι καὶ χρησιμώτεροι φανείμεν ὄντες.

In the Brutus (6, 23) we have these words: . . . dicendi autem me non tam fructus et gloria quam studium ipsum exercitatioque delectat. . . . Dicere enim bene nemo potest, nisi qui prudenter intellegit. Quare qui eloquentiae verae dat operam, dat prudentiae, qua ne maximis quidem in bellis aequo animo carere quisquam potest.

Here we see emphasis laid on the benefits produced by rhetoric on the speaker himself. This view, that speaking improves the character, we find as one of the fundamental principles of Isocrates' system. This is best presented in Ant., 277: ἔπειτα τῶν πράξεων τῶν συντείνουσῶν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐκλέγεται τὰς πρεπωδεστάτας καὶ μάλιστα συμφερούσας· ὁ δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας συνειζόμενος θεωρεῖν καὶ δοκιμάζειν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὸν ἐνεστώτα λόγον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει ταύτην δύναμιν, ὥσθ' ἅμα τὸ λέγειν εὖ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν παραγενήσεται τοῖς φιλοσόφως καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τοὺς λόγους διακειμένοις.

In this passage Isocrates is telling how the study of oratory serves to make men αὐτῶν βελτίους . . . καὶ πλείονος ἀξίους. The orator in his search for material will acquire the habits of thought which will make him superior to his fellows in action as well as in speech. We see that in both Cicero and Isocrates

the same result follows: τὸ λέγειν εὖ (= eloquentia) brings with it τὸ φρονεῖν (= prudentia).

Both Isocrates and Cicero defend not only the practice of oratory but the teaching of it as well. Isocrates rebukes the inconsistency of those who admire oratory but condemn the study of it.

Ant., 246: ζηλοῦσι τοὺς καλῶς χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ δυναμένους, ἐπιτιμῶσι δὲ τῶν νεωτέρων τοῖς τυχεῖν ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς βουλομένοις. κτλ. . . . (249) δ' οὐ μόνον ταραχῆς σημείον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀλιγωρίας· τὴν μὲν γὰρ Πειθῶ μίαν τῶν θεῶν νομίζουσιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὀρῶσι καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν θυσίαν αὐτῇ ποιουμένην, τοὺς δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ἧς ἡ θεὸς ἔχει μετασχεῖν βουλομένους ὡς κακοῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμοῦντας διαφθείρεσθαι φασιν.

The Athenians get their supremacy from their superior education. Therefore all ought to favor the culture of the mind—the highest of human pursuits. Ant., 293: αὐτοὶ προέχετε καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων . . . τῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄμεινον πεπαιδεῦσθαι τῶν ἄλλων. (302) . . . περὶ δὲ τὴν παιδείαν ἅπαντες ἂν ἡμᾶς πρωτεύειν προκρίνειαν. (304) ἦν οὖν σωφρονῆτε, τῆς μὲν ταραχῆς παύσεσθε ταύτης, . . . προτρέφετε τῶν νεωτέρων τοὺς βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένους καὶ σχολὴν ἄγειν δυναμένους ἐπὶ τὴν παιδείαν καὶ τὴν ἀσκήσιν τὴν τοιαύτην.

Similarly Cicero (Orator, 41, 142): Nam si vitiosum est dicere ornate, pellatur omnino e civitate eloquentia; sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam iuvat universam rem publicam, cur aut discere turpe est quod scire honestum est aut quod posse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum est docere?

The objection may be raised that while Cicero resembles Isocrates in these passages, the resemblance is due not to the fact that Cicero followed Isocrates, but that both copied earlier writers, Gorgias and Protagoras. Nestle¹ has shown that many of Isocrates' ideas were not original with him, but merely adaptations of the work of older sophists. Of the

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SUMMARY

I have shown Isocratean influence in Cicero's theory that the orator should be able to speak on any subject but need know but little of the details of the subject about which he speaks; that the orator is the source from which flow all the forces that produce civilization and government; that the orator is the best statesman, and also a teacher of morals; furthermore that his profession is so honorable as to lend dignity even to the teaching of it. These ideas form the background of the *De Oratore* and *Orator*. On this Cicero puts the details of his picture, drawing them probably from many sources. In pointing out the underlying Isocratean elements in the Ciceronian works I hope I have shown the futility of attempting to assign any one contemporaneous

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rhetorician or philosopher as the source for Cicero's work.¹ The limitations of this treatise do not permit me to discuss the theories of von Arnim² who thinks Cicero utilized Philo, or Kroll³ who opposes von Arnim and finds traces of the influence of Antiochus. These I hope to take up later in a discussion of the sources of the *De Oratore*.

¹ *De Inv.*, II, 3, 8, seems to imply that Cicero had been anticipated in his union of the Isocratean and Aristotelian systems. But the language is too indefinite to permit us to identify the persons referred to by *posterioribus*. At any rate the last sentence of the section (*quos ipsos simul atque illos superiores nos nobis omnes, quoad facultas tulit, proposuimus*) clearly indicates that Cicero did not merely draw upon a compiler, but went to the original sources.

² *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, pp. 97 ff.

³ *Rhein. Mus.* 58 (1903), 552 ff. Cf. Ammon in *Jahresbericht*, 126 (1905), 169 f.

DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS

IN Dionysius of Halicarnassus we find another exponent of the doctrines of Isocrates. Dionysius, like Cicero, supports the union of philosophy and rhetoric under the leadership of rhetoric,¹ and, like Cicero, he has two enemies to face: on one side the rhetoricians who denied the value of philosophy and in fact all forms of liberal education;² on the other side the philosophers who attempted to claim all that was good in rhetoric as the work of philosophy.³ He resembled Cicero also in opposing the narrow conception of Atticism that was put forward with vigor at that time. Chapter 52 of the *De Thucydide* is undoubtedly aimed at the same school of Atticists that Cicero attacked.⁴ This school, while calling themselves "Attici," restricted themselves so closely in the choice of models as to arouse the just anger of Cicero. Lysias and Thucydides were the authors whom they proposed to imitate. Between the Atticism of this school and the Atticism of Dionysius there is a vast difference. In fact the use of the same term to describe both movements, while apparently unavoidable, is apt to lead to confusion of thought. Dionysius as an Atticist strove to imitate the best in a wide range of Greek authors. His classical period does not end till Demosthenes, whom he considers the greatest of the Attic orators. The same statement holds true of Cicero.

¹ *De Orat. Ant.*, I (445): ἡ ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορικὴ.

Ad Pomp., I (757): τῆς φιλοσόφου ῥητορικῆς. 6 (784): τὴν φιλόσοφον ῥητορικὴν.

² *De Orat. Ant.*, I (446): ἐτέρα δὲ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνης παρελθοῦσα τάξιν, ἀφόρητος ἀναιδεῖα θεατρικῇ καὶ ἀνάγωγος καὶ οὔτε φιλοσοφίας οὔτε ἄλλου παιδείματος οὐδενὸς μετεληφύα ἐλευθερίου.

³ *Ep. Ad Amm.*, 2 (722): τοῦτο δὴ πεποίηκα, βέλτιστε Ἀμμαῖε, τῆς γε ἀληθείας προνοούμενος, . . . καὶ τῆς ἀπάντων τῶν περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἐσπουδακῶτων χάριτος· ἵνα μὴ τοῦθ' ὑπολάβωσιν, ὅτι πάντα περιεληφεν ἡ περιπατητικὴ φιλοσοφία τὰ ῥητορικὰ παραγγέλματα.

⁴ *Brut.*, 285, 287; *Or.*, 32. Cf. Schmid, *Atticismus*, I, p. 7, n. 9.

Hence it is plain that Cicero and Dionysius belong together as the representatives of Atticism in the broad sense of the word.

But their study of Attic models brought them something more than principles of style. Such a course might, indeed, have produced a style purer than that of the contemporary Asianic orators, and fuller and richer than that affected by the Roman Attici. It would, however, hardly have raised them above the level of the ordinary rhetoricians. The distinctive part of their system is the combination of rhetoric and philosophy, and in this Dionysius takes as his models the older rhetoricians of whom Isocrates was the best example.¹ But Dionysius is a generation later than Cicero, and the lapse of a generation has brought large changes in the field of rhetoric. The revival of the old sophistical ideal has gone far enough to make such a defense and reconstruction as Cicero gives us quite unnecessary.² Dionysius does not argue in favor of his theory, but his attitude toward the whole subject of rhetoric reveals the avowed Isocratean. Another reason for the difference between Dionysius and Cicero lies in the nature of their treatises. In a critical treatise on style there is not the room for a discussion of the purposes and aims of oratory such as we find in Cicero.³ Consequently, we shall find in

¹ The introduction to the treatise *Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων*, passim; also in the chapter on Isocrates, 4 (543): *καὶ ἐγωγέ φημι χρῆναι τοὺς μέλλοντας οὐχὶ μέρος τι τῆς πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀλλ' ὅλην αὐτὴν κτήσασθαι τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν ῥήτορα διὰ χαιρός. καὶ εἰ τις ἐπιτηδεύει τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, μὴ τὸ θεωρητικὸν αὐτῆς μόνον ἀγαπᾷν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, μηδ' ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς ἄλυστον ἔξει βίον, ταῦτα προαιρούμενος, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς ὠφελήσει, παρακλευσαίμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ ῥήτορος μιμεῖσθαι προαίρεσιν.*

Cf. Christ-Schmid, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, II, 1 (5th ed.), p. 356: Das rhetorische System, das seinen Schriften zugrunde liegt, stellt ein nicht sehr klares Kompromiss aus platonischen, isokratischen, peripatetischen (aristotelischen und theophrastischen) und stoischen Elementen dar.

² *De Orat. Ant.*, 2, 3 (447-449).

³ A closer parallel to Cicero could probably be established if we had the lost treatise *Ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς φιλοσοφίας πρὸς τοὺς κατατρέχοντας αὐτῆς ἀδίκως*. *De Thuc.*, 2 (814).

Dionysius little that discusses directly the ideals of oratory presented by Isocrates, but we must arrive at his point of view rather by consideration of his general attitude toward rhetoric, and by utilizing hints that he drops here and there.

It is in the preface to the treatise *On the Ancient Orators* that we find the fullest account of the ideal rhetoric. There Dionysius sketches briefly the vicissitudes through which φιλόσοφος ῥητορική has passed. I give a summary of his account.

'Our age is an age of improvement in many respects; particularly because the practice of "political oratory" (τῆς περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἐπιμελείας) has increased. For the old philosophic rhetoric (ἡ ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορική) decayed after the time of Alexander, and almost disappeared. Into its place there came a usurper, partaking neither of philosophy nor any other liberal study.¹ This deceived the people and appropriated the offices in the state that belonged to the philosophic rhetoric. So the Attic Muse was deposed from her rightful position by a barbarian stranger. But time has restored the old sound rhetoric and expelled the usurper. We ought to be glad that the change has been so rapid. It has spread to all except a few Asiatic cities. The change has been due to Rome and the wisdom of her rulers, under whose guidance sound wisdom (τὸ φρόνιμον)² has increased, and folly has been compelled to learn sense. Therefore the present age is producing histories, political and philosophical treatises in large numbers. The interest in empty oratory will hardly

¹ Compare the remarks of Crassus on the appearance of *Latini magistri dicendi* in Rome, Cicero *De Orat.*, III, 24, 93: Verborum eligendorum et conlocandorum et concludendorum facilis est vel ratio vel sine ratione ipsa exercitatio; rerum est silva magna, quam cum Graeci iam non tenerent, ob eamque causam iuventus nostra dediceret paene discendo, etiam Latini, si dis placet, hoc biennio magistri dicendi exstiterunt; quos ego censor edicto meo sustuleram, non quo, ut nescio quos dicere aiebant, acui ingenia adulescentium nollem, sed contra ingenia obtundi nolui, corroborari impudentiam.

² Compare Isocrates' φρονεῖν, φρόνησις, φρόνιμος in connection with λέγειν.

last more than a generation. My purpose in this treatise is to explain which of the ancient orators are most valuable to those pursuing political philosophy (τοῖς ἀσκοῦσι τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν).¹

There are several points in this passage that show the influence of Isocrates. In the first place the *ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορική* which he later calls *σώφρων* can be none other than the system of which Isocrates was the best exponent.¹ The content of the adjective *φιλόσοφος* applied to rhetoric can best be explained by comparing De Isoc., 4 (543, 544): καὶ εἰ τις ἐπιτηδεύει τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, μὴ τὸ θεωρητικὸν² αὐτῆς μόνον ἀγαπῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, μὴδ' ἂφ' ὧν αὐτὸς ἄλυκτον ἔξει βίον, ταῦτα προαιρούμενος ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς ὠφελήσει, παρακελευσαίμην ἂν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ ῥήτορος μιμεῖσθαι προαίρεσιν. This is exactly Isocrates' attitude toward philosophy, as we have seen from such passages as Antidosis, 180 ff., 271; Adv. Soph., 2-8; Ant., 262; Panath., 26. A similar use of the word *φιλοσοφία* and related words appears elsewhere in this passage. In chapter 2 (447) the men who have brought about the restoration of the true rhetoric are called τοὺς συμφιλοσοφούντας ἀνθρώπους. In chapter 4 (450) the study of the ancient orators is said to be necessary to those ἀσκοῦσι τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν. Dionysius also wrote in defence of "political philosophy." (De Thuc., 2 (814) . . . πραγματείας, ἣν συνεταξάμην ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτικῆς φιλοσοφίας πρὸς τοὺς κατατρέχοντας αὐτῆς ἀδίκως.) This *πολιτικὴ φιλοσοφία* can

¹ The contest between Dionysius and the Asian school was not merely over style. It was a contest of *φιλόσοφος ῥητορική* against *ἀναίδεια θεατρικὴ οὔτε φιλοσοφίας οὔτε ἄλλου παιδείματος οὐδενὸς μεταληψύα*, i. e., of learning against ignorance. v. Kaibel in Hermes, XX (1885), 509, who has noticed this connection between Isocrates and Dionysius. v. also Rohde in Rh. Mus., XLI (1886), 175.

² In Ant. Rom., II, 21, 1, he adopts the same attitude toward the philosophy which is only theoretical. 'Ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ μὲν τούτων (i. e., the meaning of myths) τοῖς αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ θεωρητικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρος ἀποτεγμημένοις ἀφελίσθω σκοπεῖν, τῆς δ' ὑπὸ 'Ρωμύλου κατασταθείσης πολιτείας καὶ τάδε ἡγησάμην ἱστορίας ἄξια.

hardly be anything except rhetoric regarded from the Isocratean standpoint as a preparation for public life.¹

We have also seen that Isocrates considered his course as the best preparation for public life. Dionysius holds the same view. One of the wrongs done by the usurping rhetoric was that it deprived the "philosophic rhetoric" of the leadership in the state which was its lawful possession. *De Orat. Ant.*, I (446): *ἐτέρα δὲ τις . . . τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς προστασίας τῶν πόλεων, ὥς ἔδει τὴν φιλόσοφον ἔχειν, εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀνηρτήσατο.*

It is interesting to notice the variety of results that have come from the rehabilitation of the ἀρχαία ῥητορική.

De Orat. Ant., 4 (449): *τοιγάρτοι πολλαὶ μὲν ἱστορίαι σπουδῆς ἀξίαι γράφονται τοῖς νῦν, πολλοὶ δὲ λόγοι πολιτικοὶ χαρίεντες ἐκφέρονται φιλόσοφοί τε συντάξεις οὐ μὰ Δία εὐκαταφρόνητοι ἄλλαι τε πολλαὶ καὶ καλὰ πραγματεῖαι καὶ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Ἑλλήσιν εὖ μάλα διεσπουδασμένοι προεληλύθασι τε καὶ προελεύσονται κατὰ τὸ εἶκος.* It is difficult to say to what works Dionysius here refers. Egger (*Denys d'Halicarnasse*, p. 42) suggests that by *ἱστορίαι* he means the work of Diodorus Siculus, and by *λόγοι πολιτικοὶ* and *φιλόσοφοι συντάξεις* the rhetorical and philosophical works of Cicero—a conjecture which is very tempting in view

¹ Cf. *De Isoc.*, I (534): *ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ἀνὴρ ἐγένετο, φιλοσοφίας ἐπεθύμησε.*

De Isoc., I (537): *πλοῦτον δὲ οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας χρηματισαμένων περιποιησάμενος.*

De Isoc., 12 (558): *κατὰ δὲ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον τῆς προαιρέσεως.*

Ibid., *δοσι φιλοσόφους τοῦ μαθήματος τούτου (ῥητορικῆς) πρόεστησαν.*

Ad Pomp., 4 (777): *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἐξελέξατο καλὰς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ ἀνδρὶ φιλοσόφῳ προσηκούσας.*

The discussion of political questions, according to Dionysius, belongs to the orator rather than the philosopher. In speaking of Plato's failure in writing on such subjects he says (*De Dem.*, 23, 1025, 1026), *καμοὶ γε πολλάκις ἐπήλθεν εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων αὐτοῦ λόγων, δ' ἀποποιῆται παρ' Ὀμήρῳ πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ὃ Ζεὺς λέγων·*

Οὐ τοι, τέκνον ἐμόν, δέδοται πολεμῆμα ἔργα,
ἀλλὰ σὺ γ' ἱμερόεντα μετέρχαιο ἔργα γάμοιο

Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων, ταῦτα δὲ πολιτικοῖς καὶ ῥήτορσιν ἀνδράσι μελῆσαι.

of the close connection that exists between Cicero and Dionysius in general principles. It is more probable, however, that the reference is to the works of some of the archaizing school contemporary with Dionysius, *e. g.*, the histories and speeches of Messalla. The benefits of the "philosophic rhetoric" as here presented are not so far reaching as those described by Isocrates, but the difference is one of quantity rather than quality. In both writers rhetoric is the basis for sound work in other spheres.

In chapter 4 (450) Dionysius describes the subject that he has chosen: *ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ λόγου κοινὴν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ πλεῖστα δυναμένην ὡφελῆσαι λαβών*. This meets the demands of Isocrates, *Ant.*, 276: *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ λέγειν ἢ γράφειν προαιρούμενος λόγους ἀξίους ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ποιήσεται τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀδίκους ἢ μικρὰς ἢ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων ἀλλὰ μεγάλας καὶ καλὰς καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων*.

We have seen in the introduction to the treatise *De Oratoribus Antiquis* indications that Dionysius was a follower of Isocrates. This is plainly stated in the essay on Isocrates. In chapter I he sketches Isocrates' career. The material is almost entirely from Isocrates' own works. The significant point for us is that he accepts Isocrates' claim to be more than a common rhetorician. I give the most important portions.

I (535): *ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ δόξης καὶ τοῦ πρωτεῦσαι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ*¹ *καθάπερ αὐτὸς εἴρηκεν, ἐπὶ τὸ γράφειν ἃ διανοηθεῖη κατέφυνγεν, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων οὐδὲ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν τότε σοφιστῶν, περὶ δὲ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν <καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων>*,² *ἐξ ὧν ὑπελάμβανε τὰς τε πόλεις ἄμεινον οἰκῆσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἐπίδοσιν ξεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν*.

His great service was to reform rhetoric and make it practical.

¹ Cf. *De Demosth.*, 51 (1112): *ὁρῶν γε δὴ τοὺτους τοὺς θαυμαζομένους ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ κρατίστων λόγων ποιητὰς νομιζομένους Ἰσοκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα*.

² *Panath.*, 11; cf. *Ant.*, 46.

I (536): *πεφυρμένην τε παραλαβὼν τὴν ἄσκησιν τῶν λόγων ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Πρωταγόραν σοφιστῶν πρῶτος ἐχώρησεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ φυσικῶν¹ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζων τὴν ἐπιστήμην διετέλεσεν, ἐξ ἧς, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν τὰ συμφέροντα παραγίνεται τοῖς μαθοῦσιν.²*

He recognizes Isocrates as the most famous man of his time; I (536): *ἐπιφανέστατος δὲ γενόμενος τῶν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀκμασάντων χρόνον.*

He also notes the variety of pursuits which the pupils of Isocrates followed; I (536): *οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς δικανικοῖς ἐγένοντο ἀριστοὶ λόγοις, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν διήνεγκαν, [καὶ] ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς κοινὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων πράξεις ἀνέγραψαν.*

The nobility of subject in the works of Isocrates which Dionysius alludes to in the first chapter, he takes up at great length beginning with chapter four and continuing through chapter ten. This passage, comprising more than a quarter of the whole treatise, is the more remarkable because in the criticisms of the other orators the subject matter is touched on but lightly, or wholly ignored, and the treatise is devoted almost entirely to a discussion of style. On the style of Isocrates, however, he does not have so much to say, nor does he always speak of it with approval. For the subject matter he has nothing but the most fulsome praise. In Dionysius' opinion Isocrates provides in his orations the best of instruction in ethics and politics, and surpasses the philosophers in their own field. I give below the passages from chapters four to ten bearing on this subject:

4 (543): *. . . ὅσα περὶ τὴν πραγματικὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ πολλῶ μείζονά ἐστι παρ' Ἰσοκράτει καὶ κρείττονα, μάλιστα δ' ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ τῶν λόγων, περὶ οὗς ἐσπούδαζε, καὶ τῶν ὑποθέσεων τὸ κάλλος, ἐν αἷς ἐποιεῖτο τὰς διατριβάς. ἐξ ὧν οὐ λέγειν δεινοὺς μόνον ἀπεργάσαιτ' ἂν τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτῷ τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἥθη*

¹ Cf. Isoc. Hel., 1-5, and p. 19. Panath., 26 ff.

² Cf. Isoc. Ep., V, 4; Ant., 255 ff.; 271 ff. and p. 3.

σπουδαίους, οἷκω τε καὶ πόλει καὶ ὅλη τῇ Ἑλλάδι χρησίμους.¹ κράτιστα γὰρ δὴ παιδεύματα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐν τοῖς Ἰσοκράτους ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν λόγοις. καὶ ἐγὼ γέ φημι χρῆναι τοὺς μέλλοντας οὐχὶ μέρος τι τῆς πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀλλ' ὅλην αὐτὴν κτήσασθαι τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν ῥήτορα διὰ χειρός. καὶ εἴ τις ἐπιτηδεύει τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, μὴ τὸ θεωρητικὸν αὐτῆς μόνον ἀγαπῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, μὴδ' ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς ἄλυτον ἔξει βίον, ταῦτα προαιρούμενος, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς ὠφελήσει, παρακελευσαίμην ἂν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ ῥήτορος μιμεῖσθαι προαίρῃσιν.

5 (544): τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο φιλόπολις τε καὶ φιλόδημος ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτηδεύσειε τὴν πολιτικὴν καλοκάγαθίαν ἀναγνοὺς αὐτοῦ τὸν Πανηγυρικόν; ἐν ᾧ διεξιὼν κτλ.²

6 (546): τίς δ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγαπήσειε μέγεθος ἔχων ἀνὴρ καὶ δυνάμεως τινος ἡγούμενος, ἃ πρὸς Φίλιππον αὐτῷ τὸν Μακεδόνα γέγραπται; ἐν οἷς ἀξιοῖ κτλ.

6 (547): πολλὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας ταῦτα δυνάστας φρονημάτων τε μείζονος ὑποπίμπλασθαι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

7 (547): τίς δὲ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν προτρέψαιτο³ καθ' ἑαστόν τε ἀνδρα ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ τὰς πόλεις ὅλας τοῦ Περί τῆς εἰρήνης λόγου; ἐν γὰρ δὴ τούτῳ κτλ.

7 (549): τούτων γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις ἂν ἢ βελτίους ἢ ἀληθεστέρους ἢ μᾶλλον πρέποντας φιλοσοφία δύναιτο λόγους εἰπεῖν.

8 (549): τίς δὲ τὸν Ἀρεοπαγитικὸν ἀναγνοὺς λόγον οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κοσμιώτερος, ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειε τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος; ὅς ἐτόλμησε διαλεχθῆναι κτλ.

9 (551): τίς δ' ἂν μᾶλλον πείσειε καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἀνδρας τοῦ ῥήτορος πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ, μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῷ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους γραφέντι λόγῳ, ὃς ἐπιγράφεται μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος, κτλ.

9 (554): ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ Λακεδαιμονίους μόνους συμβουλεύειν φαίην

¹ Cf. Isoc. Ep., IV, 2; Ant., 278; and p. 3.

² Cf. Isocrates' praise of the Panegyricus in Ant., 60: ἐνθυμήθητε δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς, εἰ δοκῶ τοῖς λόγοις διαφθεῖρην τοὺς νεωτέρους ἀλλὰ μὴ προτρέπτειν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνους.

³ Cf. what Isocrates says about this oration in Ant., 65: . . . ἐπὶ τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην παρακαλῶ.

ἐν αὐτὸν ἔγωγε ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις "Ἑλλήσι καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πολλῷ κρεῖττον ἀπάντων φιλοσόφων, οἱ τέλος ποιοῦνται τοῦ βίου τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ καλόν.

IO (555): ἔχων δὲ πολλοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλους διεξιέναι λόγους πρὸς πόλεις τε καὶ δυνάστας καὶ ἰδιώτας γραφέντας, ὧν οἱ μὲν εἰς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ σωφροσύνην τὰ πλήθη παρακαλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ εἰς μετρίότητα καὶ νόμιμον ἀρχὴν τοὺς δυνάστας προάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ κοσμίους τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἀπεργάζονται τοὺς βίους, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενοι, δεδοικώς μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ὁ λόγος ἐκμηκυνθῇ μοι, ταῦτα μὲν ἔασω.

In chapter 12 (558) Isocrates is compared with Lysias. κατὰ δὲ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον τῆς προαιρέσεως πλείον διαφέρειν (i. e., Ἴσοκράτην Λυσίου) ἢ παιδὸς ἄνδρα, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων εἴρηκεν, εἰ δὲ χρὴ τάληθές εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ρητόρων, ὅσοι φιλοσόφως τοῦ μαθήματος τοῦτου πρόεστησαν.¹

In the Epistle to Pompeius Geminus we have an illustration of the application of this theory to criticism.² In this Epistle Dionysius gives his views on Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus. He prefers Herodotus to Thucydides for a number of reasons, among which the first and most important is his greater skill in choosing the subject.³ Ad Pomp., 3, 2 (767): πρῶτόν τε καὶ σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖότατον

¹ Cf. also 15 (565), where by way of introduction to the quotation from the De Pace, he says: διδάσκων ὡς ἔστιν οὐ μόνον κρείττων ἢ δικαιοσύνη τῆς ἀδικίας ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμωτέρα.

² Cf. Christ-Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, II, 1, (5th ed.) p. 356 f.: Ganz unter rhetorisch-isokratischem Standpunkt steht seine Auffassung von der Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers. . . .

³ Cf. F. Nassal, Aesthetisch-rhetorische Beziehungen zwischen Dionysius von Halicarnassus und Cicero, p. 93: "Das rhetorische Element in ihrer Geschichtsauffassung, wie die Ergötzung durch Wahl eines dankbaren Stoffes und rhetorisch aufgeputzte Behandlung desselben, ferner die freie Stellung des Historikers dem überlieferten Stoff gegenüber atmet ganz den Geist der von Isocrates inaugurierte Geschichtschreibung." Nassal, however, does not show any *direct* connection between Dionysius and Isocrates.

ἔργον ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τοῖς γράφουσιν πᾶσιν ἱστορίας ὑπόθεσιν ἐκλέξασθαι καλὴν καὶ κεχαρισμένην τοῖς ἀναγνωσκομένοις. τοῦτο Ἡρόδοτος κρεῖττον μοι δοκεῖ πεποιηκέναι Θουκυδίδου.¹ This criticism is repeated in De Imit. and De Thuc.

De Imit., II, 6, 3 (424): τῶν μέντοι συγγραφέων Ἡρόδοτος μὲν ἐξείργασται βέλτιον τὸ πραγματικὸν εἶδος.

De Thuc., 5 (820): ὁ δ' Ἀλικαρνασεὺς Ἡρόδοτος, γενόμενος ὀλίγῳ πρότερον τῶν Περσικῶν, παρεκτείνας δὲ μέχρι τῶν Πελοποννησιακῶν, τὴν τε πραγματικὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἐξήνεγκε καὶ λαμπρότερον κτλ.²

In similar style he criticises Xenophon and Philistus.

Ad Pomp., 4 (777): Ξενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Φίλιστος οἱ τούτοις ἐπακμάσαντες οὔτε φύσεις ὁμοίας εἶχον οὔτε προαιρέσεις. Ξενοφῶν μὲν γὰρ Ἡροδότου ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο κατ' ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς χαρακτήρας, τὸν τε πραγματικὸν καὶ τὸν λεκτικόν· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἐξελέξατο καλὰς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ ἀνδρὶ³ φιλοσόφῳ προσηκούσας.

Ad Pomp., 5 (779): Φίλιστος δὲ Θουκυδίδη μᾶλλον <ἀν> δόξειεν εὐοκέναι καὶ κατ' ἐκείνον κοσμεῖσθαι τὸν χαρακτήρα. οὔτε γὰρ ὑπόθεσιν εἴληφε πολυωφελεῖ καὶ κοινὴν [ὥσπερ Θουκυδίδης], ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ ταύτην τοπικὴν.

Theopompus, "the most famous of the pupils of Isocrates," naturally comes in for praise.

Ad Pomp., 6 (782): Θεόπομπος δὲ Χῖος ἐπιφανέστατος πάντων <τῶν> Ἰσοκράτους μαθητῶν γενόμενος καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν πανηγυρικοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ συμβουλευτικοὺς συνταξάμενος λόγους ἐπιστολάς τε τὰς Χιακὰς ἐπιγραφόμενας καὶ ὑποθήκας ἄλλας λόγου ἀξίας, ἱστορίαν

¹ Cf. Isoc. Ad Nic., 48: ἐκείνο δ' οὐκ ἔστι φανερόν, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ γράφειν τι κεχαρισμένον τοῖς πολλοῖς μὴ τοὺς ὠφελιμωτάτους τῶν λόγων ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μυθωδεστάτους. There is a striking similarity between the ideals of the two writers—to produce a *pleasing* work.

² His rather unjust judgment on Thucydides is probably influenced by his animosity toward the narrow Attici, just as his judgment on Plato is warped by the passions of the conflict between philosophers and rhetoricians.

³ Cf. De Imit., II, 6, 3 (426): ὁ μὲν Ξενοφῶν Ἡροδότου ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο κατὰ τε τὰς πραγματικὰς ἀρετάς. . . .

πεπραγματευμένος ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι πρῶτον μὲν τῆς ὑποθέσεως τῶν ἱστοριῶν (καλὰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι . . .) κτλ.¹

Dionysius applies the same principle to his own work in the preface to the *Antiquitates Romanae*.

I, I, 2: ἐπέισθην γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς προαιρουμένους μνημεῖα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις καταλιπεῖν, . . . καὶ πάντων μάλιστα τοὺς ἀναγράφοντας ἱστορίας, ἐν αἷς καθιδρῦσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν [πάντες] ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἀρχὴν φρονήσεώς τε καὶ σοφίας οὖσαν, πρῶτον μὲν ὑποθέσεις προαιρεῖσθαι καλὰς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ πολλὴν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς ἀναγνωσομένοις φερούσας κτλ.

I, 2, I: τὴν μὲν οὖν ὑπόθεσιν ὅτι καλὴν εἰληφα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴ καὶ πολλοῖς ὠφέλιμον οὐ μακρῶν οἶμαι δεήσειν λόγων τοῖς γε δὴ μὴ παντάπασιν ἀπείρως ἔχουσι τῆς κοινῆς ἱστορίας.

The first Epistle to Ammaeus furnishes us with additional evidence of Dionysius' attitude toward the older rhetoric. Some philosophers of the Peripatetic school have put forward the claim that Demosthenes gained his oratorical ability from the study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Dionysius comes to the defence of Demosthenes and proves that the *Rhetoric* was written after most of Demosthenes' speeches had been delivered and, far from being the source from which Demosthenes learned rhetoric, it is a statement of the principles of rhetoric, based on a study of Demosthenes and other orators. The body of the treatise is concerned with a detailed discussion of chronology, and has no bearing on our present purpose. The interesting point is that Dionysius undertook the work to prove the value of the older school of rhetoric, as contrasted with the Peripatetic system, and secondly, to show that Demosthenes, the perfect orator, received from Isocrates and his pupil Isaeus a training that needed no supplement from the work of Aristotle.²

¹ Cf. *De Imit.*, II, 6, 3 (428).

² *Ad Amm.*, 2 (722): τοῦτο δὴ πεποίηκα . . . ἵνα μὴ τοῦθ' ὑπολάβωσιν, ὅτι πάντα περιέληφεν ἡ περιπατητικὴ φιλοσοφία τὰ ῥητορικὰ παραγγέλματα, καὶ οὐτε

Demosthenes is the consummation of the Isocratean ideal, as we shall have occasion to notice in discussing the Pseudo-Lucianic *Laudatio Demosthenis*. Consequently we should expect Dionysius to call attention to Isocratean characteristics in Demosthenes. But the essay on Demosthenes that we possess deals wholly with style, whereas it was the subject matter that Dionysius most admired in Isocrates. The treatise *Περὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος* which has not been preserved, if indeed it was ever completed,¹ would have contained commendation of Demosthenes from the Isocratean standpoint, just as the criticism of the historians is Isocratean. As a mere hint of what his judgment would have been we have the passage just quoted (*De Dem.*, 58, 1129) and *De Dinarch.* 8 (646): *λείπεται δὲ Δημοσθένους κατὰ <μὲν> τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων τῇ δεινότητι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν τῇ ποιικιλίᾳ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τῇ ἐξαλλαγῇ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν εὐρεσιν τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων τῷ μὴ καινὰ καὶ παράδοξα λαμβάνειν ἀλλὰ φανερὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ κείμενα.*

οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Θρασύμαχον καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα σπουδῆς ἄξιον οὐδὲν εἶρον οὐτε Ἴσοκράτης καὶ Ἀναξίμενης καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας οὐτε οἱ τούτοις συμβιώσαντες τοῖς ἀνδράσι παραγγελέματων τεχνικῶν συγγραφαῖς καὶ ἀγωνισταὶ λόγων ῥητορικῶν, οἱ περὶ Θεοδέκην καὶ Φίλισκον καὶ Ἰσαῖον καὶ Κηφισόδωρον Ὑπερείδην τε καὶ Δικουῖργον καὶ Αἰσχίνην, οὐδ' <ἄν> αὐτὸς ὁ Δημοσθένης ὁ πάντας ὑπερβαλόμενος τοῖς τε πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς καθ' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴδὲ τοῖς γυνόμενοις ὑπερβολὴν καταλιπὼν τοσοῦτος ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἴσοκράτους τε καὶ Ἰσαίου κοσμούμενος παραγγέλμασιν, εἰ μὴ τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους τέχνας ἐξέμαθεν.

Ad Amm., 12 (749): *ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ μὲν οὐχ ὁ ῥήτωρ παρὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὰς τέχνας παρέλαβεν αἷς τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς ἐκείνοις κατεσκεύασε λόγους, ἀλλὰ τοῖναντίον τὰ Δημοσθένους καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρων ἔργα παραθέμενος Ἀριστοτέλης ταύτας ἔγραψε τὰς τέχνας, ἱκανῶς ἀποδείξειχθαι νομίζω.* For the thought cf. *Philost. Vit. Soph.*, 213, IV: *Δημοσθένης γὰρ μαθητὴς μὲν Ἰσαίου, ζηλωτὴς δὲ Ἴσοκράτους γινόμενος ὑπερεβάλετο αὐτὸν θυμῷ κτλ.*

¹ *De Dem.*, 58 (1129): *ἐὰν δὲ σώξῃ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἡμᾶς, καὶ περὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς αὐτοῦ δεινότητος, ἔτι μείζονος ἢ τοῦδε καὶ θαυμαστοτέρου θεωρήματος, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς γραφησομένοις ἀποδώσομέν σοι τὸν λόγον.*

De Thuc., I (812): *σοῦ δὲ βουλευθέντος ἰδίαν συντάξασθαι με περὶ Θουκυδίδου γραφὴν ἅπαντα περιελιφεῖαν τὰ δέοντα λόγων, ἀναβαλόμενος τὴν περὶ Δημοσθένους πραγματείαν, ἣν εἶχον ἐν χερσίν, ὑπεσχόμεν τε ποιήσων, ὥς προηροῦ, καὶ τελέσας τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδίδωμι.*

SUMMARY

We have found that Dionysius adopts as his own the principles of the "philosophy" held by Isocrates with the corollary that the "philosophic rhetorician" is statesman and philosopher; and have followed the application of Isocrates' rules about the choice of subject to the work of literary criticism.

ARISTIDES AND PSEUDO-LUCIAN

I HAVE traced in the preceding chapters the revival of the sophistical ideal in Cicero and Dionysius. As von Arnim has pointed out,¹ this movement did not meet with immediate success. The century following Dionysius seems to have produced no one who inclined to Isocratean principles. But the second century of our era witnessed a renewed interest in the rhetorical theories which we have found in Cicero and Dionysius. It is my purpose in this chapter to discuss some phases of this later revival.

The second-century sophist, Aristides, devotes four speeches to the praise of rhetoric,—two *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς*, 'Ἐπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, and *Πρὸς Καπιτώνα*. The two *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* are answers to Plato's attack on rhetoric in the *Gorgias*; the speech 'Ἐπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων is a defense of the political careers of Pericles, Miltiades, Cimon and Themistocles; the fourth speech, *Πρὸς Καπιτώνα*, answers some objections that had been raised to arguments that he had used in the other speeches. While all four speeches are directed against Plato's criticisms of rhetoric, this reply to Plato is merely a convenient starting point for an encomium of rhetoric, in which he claims for the orator the possession of all virtues. It is plain, too, that under the name of Plato, he is attacking the philosophers of his own day.² This can be seen in the spiteful attack on philosophers with which he closes the speech 'Ἐπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων (II, 399 ff.),³ and in such phrases as these:

¹ Dio von Prusa, p. 112: Ich schreibe der Erneuerung des sophistischen Bildungsideals durch Philon die grösste geschichtliche Bedeutung zu, obgleich sie zunächst fast spurlos vorüber zu gehen scheint. Der Gedanke, die Philosophenschulen auf das praktische Ziel der rednerischen Ausbildung zuzuspitzen, hat keinen Anklang gefunden.

² See Baumgart, Aelius Aristides als Repräsentant der Sophistischen Rhetorik des zweiten Jahrhunderts der Kaiserzeit, p. 21.

³ The references are to the edition of Dindorf.

II, p. 84: τῶν Πλάτωνος ἐταίρων ἀποκρινάσθω τις, ἐπειδὴ περ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔχομεν παραστήσασθαι.

II, p. 149: εἰπέ δὴ μοι πρὸς θεῶν, εἴτε Πλάτων εἴτε ἄλλος τις ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου βούλεται. . . .

The battle between the philosophers and the rhetoricians was still going on, and Aristides in spite of all his attempts to prove that Plato supports the sophistical ideal, merely calls attention to the irreconcilable differences between the philosophers and the rhetoricians.

Much of this chapter has been anticipated by Baumgart in the second chapter of his very useful book on Aristides. But I hope to show by a more detailed presentation of some of Aristides' theories of rhetoric, and by a comparison of them with those of his predecessors, that in all essential particulars he belongs to the same school as Isocrates, Cicero and Dionysius. The verbal correspondences with Isocrates are not so close as in Cicero and Dionysius, but this is due rather to Aristides' verbosity than to any difference of thought.

One of the striking passages in Isocrates is his account of the growth of civilization through the power of λόγος (Nic., 5-8 = Ant., 253-256). This was utilized by Cicero, and appears in Aristides. The latter casts the story in the form of a myth. "Newly created man was inferior to the animals and was in danger of being utterly destroyed. Prometheus pleaded with Zeus to save the human race. At his suggestion Zeus sent Hermes to bestow on mankind the blessing of rhetoric. Under its influence men ceased quarrelling with one another, formed communities, built cities, and made laws."¹ In another passage (II, pp. 63-75) Aristides enlarges on the services rendered by rhetoric in establishing laws and maintaining justice among men.

The resemblances to Isocrates are plain. For the sake of illustration I shall quote the principal steps in the growth of civilization as pictured by Isocrates and the parallels in Aristides.

¹ II, pp. 134 ff.

Isoc. Nic., 5 (= Ant., 253): τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλοις οἷς ἔχομεν οὐδὲν τῶν ζώων διαφέρομεν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ τῷ τὰ χεῖ καὶ τῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις εὐπορίαις καταδέστεροι τυγχάνομεν ὄντες.

Cf. Arist., II, p. 134: πᾶσι γὰρ πάντων ἀπελείποντο ἄλλοτε ἄλλων, τὰ χεῖ μὲν τῶν πτηνῶν ἀπάντων . . . κατ' ἴσχυν δ' αὖ πόρρω τῶν λεόντων . . . καὶ μὴν τῇ γε κατασκευῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐ μόνον τῶν προβάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κοχλιῶν ἀπελείποντο.

The blessings of civilized society followed the introduction of rhetoric.

Isoc. Nic., 6 (= Ant., 254): ἐγγενομένου δ' ἡμῖν τοῦ πείθειν ἀλλήλους . . . οὐ μόνον τοῦ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγημεν ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες πόλεις ὥκισαμεν καὶ νόμους ἐθέμεθα καὶ τέχνας εὗρομεν.

Arist., II, p. 135: ἀφικομένης δὲ ῥητορικῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους . . . ἡδυνήθησαν μὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν μετὰ τῶν θηρίων διαίταν χαλεπὴν ἐκφυγεῖν, . . . κοινωνίας δ' εὗρον ἀρχήν. καταβάντες δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρών . . . πόλιν τε κατεσκεύασαντο . . . καὶ τοὺς πόλεων ἡγεμόνας νόμους ἔθεντο καὶ ἄρχοντας καὶ πολιτείαν ἐνόμισαν.

The other passage in Aristides (II, pp. 63-75) is simply an expansion of the words of Isocrates—νόμους ἐθέμεθα . . . τοῦτ' (i. e., λόγῳ) τοὺς κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν. In a lengthy argument Aristides shows that rhetoric was invented to insure justice and equity, that through rhetoric alone life is made possible,¹ that the establishment of laws and the maintenance of courts of justice presupposes the existence of rhetoric.² Of the three, νόμοι, δίκη, λόγοι, the chief place must be accorded to

¹ II, p. 64: εὐρέθη τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ῥητορικὴ καὶ παρήλθε φυλακτήριον δικαιοσύνης καὶ σύνδεσμος τοῦ βίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . εὐρεθεῖσα δὲ ὑπὲρ τοιούτων καὶ τηλικούτων μόνῃ βιωτὸν ἡμῖν πεποίηκε τὸν βίον.

² II, pp. 64-71, especially p. 65: φαίνεται . . . μέρος οὐσα τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἢ νομοθετικῆ καὶ τοῖς πᾶσι δευτέρα πως, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔδει τῶν νόμων λόγου τοῦ πείθοντος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν εὐδὺλον ὅτι οἱ νόμοι μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πάντας τὸ προσήκον ἔχον ἐμελλον τεθῆσθαι, τοῦτο δ' οἱ τῇ χειρὶ κρείττους οὐκ ἐμελλον συμβουλήσασθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἔδει λόγου τοῦ πείσοντος ἦδη; p. 67: πόθεν εὐρήσει τὸ δίκαιον ἢ παρὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς; ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγχει τὰ γινόμενα (cf. Isoc. Nic., 7: τοῦτ' καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν). p. 68: . . . ἥ τε δικαστικὴ σχῆμα ἐπικούρου λαβοῦσα τοῖς νόμοις αὐτὴ πρότερον προσεδέχθη τῆς παρὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς βοηθείας. ἔδει γὰρ αὐτὴν δυναθῆναι βοηθῆσαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ ῥητορικῆς.

λόγοι.¹ In this view that all development of society and civilization is the result of rhetoric Aristides has adopted and expanded the doctrine of Isocrates and Cicero.

This account of the development of civilization and government under the guidance of the orator forms the historical background for the theories of rhetoric as a training for practical life. This was the main thesis of Isocrates' system, that the orator is the best statesman, the best philosopher, the best manager of his own affairs. This point is insisted on by Aristides and developed by him at great length and with abundance of historical examples. The principal passage is the speech *Ἐπὶ τῶν τεττάρων*—a defense of Miltiades, Cimon, Themistocles and Pericles. I have shown above (p. 42 ff.) that a writer's attitude toward these statesmen is a test of his attitude toward the sophistical rhetoric. So that when Aristides undertakes to prove against the arguments of Plato that these statesmen were true *ῥήτορες* and leaders of the people, he is taking his position beside Isocrates and Cicero. A complete statement of all the arguments by which he answers, or thinks that he answers, the criticisms of Plato would extend far beyond the limits of the dissertation, but I will give enough quotations to show his general attitude.

Of Pericles he says:

II, p. 175: *λαλιᾷς μὲν οἶμαι διὰ κενῆς ληρεΐν καὶ εἰς μηδὲν δέον καὶ διατρίβειν τὴν ἄλλως, λόγων δὲ ἀληθινῶν τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων στοχάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ πρέπον σῶζειν πανταχοῦ. τοῦτοις γοῦν ἔπεται καὶ τὸ κρατεῖν οἶμαι καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς προσάγεσθαι τῶν ἀκούοντων. ὁ τοίνυν Περικλῆς τοσοῦτον νικῶν καὶ τοσαῦτα ἀφ' ὧν ἐνίκᾳ πράττων λάλος μὲν ἦκιστα, οἶμαι, λέγειν δὲ ἄριστος εἰκότως ἐνομίζετο. . . . εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ σεμνοτέρου μάρτυρος, σκόπει τί φησιν ὁ Θουκυδίδης ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγοις. εὐρήσεις γὰρ ἀπανταχοῦ μεμνημένον ὡς ἀρίστου λέγειν καὶ οὐδ' ἀμφισβήτησιν δόντα ὅτι μὴ*

¹ II, p. 71: *ἀλλ' ἔστι μᾶς ὥσπερ εἰ μόρας καὶ φύσεως οἱ νόμοι, ἡ δίκη, οἱ λόγοι. τριῶν δ' οὐδὼν τούτων δυνάμεων, ὅπερ λέγων ἐξέβην, ἀπάσας τὰς χώρας ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη καταλαμβάνει.*

καὶ πράττειν οὗτός γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν προστίθῃσιν, ἐπειδὴν πρῶτον αὐτὸν εἶναι φῆ.

In this passage the following points demand especial notice: *λαλιᾶς* is contrasted with *λόγων ἀληθινῶν* as an answer to the charge that Pericles made the Athenians *λάλους*.¹ The use of *στοχάζεσθαι* is at the same time a reply to the disparaging statement that rhetoric is mere guesswork,² and an acceptance of Isocrates' idea that *ἐπιστήμη* is impossible, and that true *σοφία* consists in *δόξα*.³ This is, of course, one of the fundamental differences between Plato and Isocrates, and is therefore a valuable indication of the standpoint of Aristides. Another Isocratean point is the connection of *πράττειν* and *λέγειν* (cf. p. 3). Still another resemblance is the use of *καιρός*,—one of Isocrates' catch-words (cf. p. 3).

The connection between statesmanship and rhetoric is brought out even more clearly on p. 202: ἀλλ' ὁρῶντες ἄνδρα καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν⁴ ἄκρον καὶ δουλείας μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἐγγύς, ἄρχειν δ' ἐπιτηδεύτατον καὶ ἱκανώτατον καὶ πάντων ὑπερφυκτότα τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπαθόν τι Ὀμηρικὸν καὶ παραπλήσιον αὐτὸν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐνόμισαν.⁵

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, 515 E: ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἄργοις καὶ δειλοῖς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους. . . .

² Plato, *Gorgias*, 463 A: δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

³ Isoc. *Ant.*, 271: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν, ἣν ἔχοντες ἂν εἰδείμεν ὅτι πρακτικὸν ἢ λεκτικὸν ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφοῦς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους κτλ.

Panath., 30: Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους . . . ; πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιτυχῇ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένην ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος.

⁴ The combination of *πράττειν* and *λέγειν* is thoroughly Isocratean; cf. p. 4, n. 1.

⁵ Cf. Cic. *De Orat.*, III, 14, 53: quem deum, ut ita dicam, inter homines putant?

ἐπαθόν τι Ὀμηρικὸν alludes to such passages as *Od.*, VII, 71:

οἱ μὲν ῥα θεὸν ὥς εἰσορῶντες
δεῖδεχатаι μύθοισιν, ὅτε στείχησ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

Of Miltiades we have the following characteristic passages:

II, p. 231: οὐκοῦν πάνθ' ἅμα μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀτεχνον τριβὴν εἶναι, καὶ τὸν Μιλτιάδην καὶ τοῦ λέγειν τεχνίτην καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς λόγοις παραπλήσιον.

II, p. 232: διὸ δὴ καὶ προῦκρίθη (Μιλτιάδης) μόνος ἐξ ἀπάντων, ὡς φασι, τὴν χεῖρα ἐκτετακὼς γραφῆναι, ὡς τότε ἔτυχε τοῖς στρατιώταις παρακελεύμενος. οὕτως ἐκεῖνός γε οὐ μόνον ἐν πρυκί [τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ], ἀλλὰ καὶ Μαραθῶνι ῥήτωρ χρηστὸς ἦν καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀγαθὸν παρείχετο σὼν πανταχοῦ. This last sentence carries a double meaning. At first sight it seems to say no more than that Miltiades made a good speech before the battle. But there is suggested the thought that the orator is the best general—a principle which Aristides elsewhere enunciates with great clearness, *e. g.*:

II, p. 140: μετὰ τοίνυν τῆς στρατηγικῆς γενομένη πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὥσκειν αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς στρατηγικῆς πέφυκεν.

II, p. 141: θεῖς τὴν ῥητορικὴν τῆς στρατηγικῆς τοσοῦτῳ κυριωτέραν, ὅσῳ δέκα ἄνδρες δέκα μυριάδων ἐλάττους ἀριθμῷ· εἰκότως. οὐ γὰρ πόρρωθεν εἰλήφει τὸν ἔλεγχον, ἀλλ' εἰ τότε ὠρμημένους Ἀχαιοὺς ἀνίστασθαι καὶ ὑφαιρουντας ἤδη τὰ ἔρματα τῶν νεῶν καὶ τὴν θάλατταν, ὑπερβοῶντας μὴ κατέσχον οἱ δύο οὗτοι ῥήτορες, τί πλέον τῶν τακτικῶν ἦν . . . ; ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅπερ οἱ σκευοφόροι τοῖς ὀπλίταις εἰσὶ, τοῦτ' ἐφάνη τότε πᾶσα οὔσα παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ἅπασι τοῦτοις ῥητορικῇν (cf. II, p. 52, quoted below, p. 60).

Aristides also praises Solon, who was adduced by Isocrates as an example of the orator-statesman.¹ Plato had classed Solon with the poets.² But Aristides shows from Plato's own statements that poetry stripped of metre and rhythm becomes *δημηγορία*, so that if Solon had never spoken from the *βῆμα*, we should still have to class him with the political leaders. He then continues (II, p. 361): οὐκ ἔδων οὐδ' ἐν μέτροις ἐπολιτεύετο, ἀλλὰ τῷ τῆς ῥητορικῆς τύπῳ καθαρῶς χρώμενος, ἐν οἷς ἅπασι

Parallel passages are collected in a note on Od., XV, 520, in Ameis-Hentze, Anhang zu Homers Odyssee.

¹ Ant., 235, 313.

² Phaedrus, 278 c; Tim., 21 B.

κάλλιστα ἐπέδειξεν ὅτι τῷ γε ὀρθοτάτῳ τῶν λόγων αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη ῥήτωρ καὶ σοφός, ἀμφοτέρας γοῦν ἔσχε τὰς ἐπωνυμίας τε καὶ δυνάμεις, καὶ ὅτι γε ἡ ῥητορικὴ καὶ ἡ νομοθετικὴ τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσι φύσεως (cf. p. 206).

These five statesmen form the basis for Aristides' claim that oratory and statesmanship are inseparably united. These are the same examples used by Isocrates (who adds to the list Clisthenes), and the claims made for them are the same in both writers—that the statesmen were orators, and that through their oratory came their power as statesmen.

Before leaving this part of the subject, I shall give a few passages from the two treatises *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* in which an abstract statement is made of this principle.

II, p. 52: (Replying to Plato's charge that rhetoric is *στοχαστικός*) τί δὲ περὶ ῥητορικῆς εἰ στοχάζεται; θαυμάζεις; φαίνεται γὰρ ὁμοίως διακειμένη τῇ μαντικῇ, πλὴν ὅσον μαντικὴ μὲν ἀπῆλλακται στοχασαμένη, ῥητορικὴ δὲ οὐ στοχάζεται μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρᾶττει διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν ἅτ' ἂν εὐρίσκη βέλτιστα. ὥστε καὶ τὸν τῆς μαντικῆς ἐπέχει λόγον καὶ τὸν τῆς στρατηγικῆς,¹ ἢν μὴδὲν τῇ πολιτικῇ προσήκειν Πλάτων οὐκ ἐρεῖ.

II, p. 58: ὁ τι γὰρ ἂν φαίης ἀρμόττει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀκοῦσαι τῷ ῥήτορι, ἀρχῶν, προστάτης, διδάσκαλος, πάντα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ ῥήτορος τὰ ὀνόματα.

II, p. 59: πάντες μὲν οὖν ἄρχοντες φύσει κρείττους τῶν ὑφ' αὐτοῖς· εἰ δὲ τις μετ' ἐξουσίας καὶ χαρίζεται, περὶ τῶν οὐκ ἀναγκάζων, καὶ πρὸς τῷ σώζειν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν στοχάζεται,² καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ὑφ' αὐτῷ, οὗτος ἐκείνός ἐστιν ὁ τῷ ὄντι πολιτικός καὶ δν Ὅμηρος ἔφη πατέρα ὥς ἦπιον εἶναι. οἶμαι δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ῥήτορα ἀριστον πεποίηκεν, ὃ τοῦτο ἀνέθηκε.

II, p. 98: εἰ γὰρ δεῖ συνελόντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἄλλο ῥητορικὴ ἢ φρόνησις λόγων δύναμιν προσεληφύει,³ ὥς μὴ μόνον αὐτὸς ἔρδειν τὰ βέλτιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρους πείθειν ἔχοι.

¹ Cf. the references quoted above (p. 77 f.) in connection with Miltiades.

² Cf. the use of *στοχάζεσθαι* in II, 175, and the defense of *στοχάζεσθαι*, II, 42 f., 53, 54.

³ Cf. Isocrates' *φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν*. (For passages v. p. 3.)

II, p. 121: καὶ τοσοῦτῳ γέ τι τῶν κυβερνητῶν οἱ ῥήτορες κυριώτεροι ἢ τῶν ναυτῶν ἐκεῖνοι, ὅσον οἱ μὲν πλεόντων εἰσὶ κύριοι τῶν ναυτῶν, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πλεῖν ἢ μὴ τοὺς κυβερνήτας· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀμφοτέρων εἰσὶ κύριοι, καὶ τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ τῶν ἐμπλεόντων, οἱ ῥήτορες. διδάσκουσί γε καὶ πείθουσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πότε καὶ ποῖ πλευστέον.

II, p. 122: ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ οὐ σώζειν οἶδε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκτινύνειν καὶ ἐκβάλλειν οὓς ἄμεινον· ὥστε τέλειον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ κράτος τῷ ῥήτορι. καὶ ὁ μὲν γε κυβερνήτης οὐδὲ οὓς σώζει πρὸς ἀξίαν σώζει . . . ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώζειν μερίδα σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ πληροῖ.

II, p. 129: οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ φιλοσόφου μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος εἰδέναι πότε χρῆσιμῶν. καὶ μὴν ὅστις γε ἂ προσήκει λέγειν οἶδεν, οἶδεν ἂ πρᾶττειν προσήκει.

II, p. 130: ὅσῳ γὰρ βέλτιον ἔρχειν ἢ διακονεῖν, τοσοῦτῳ λέγειν τὰ δέοντα βέλτιον ἢ πράττειν.

II, p. 133: ἔστιν ἄρα ῥητορικῆς ἔργον καὶ φρονεῖν ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν ἀδεῖ πράττοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρους πείθοντα ἀδεῖ πράττειν παρέχεσθαι, καὶ ὅλως εἶναι βασιλικόν.

The conflict between rhetoric and philosophy is nowhere plainer than in Aristides. All the speeches in defense of rhetoric are, either openly or covertly, attacks on the philosophical schools. Plato bears the brunt of the attack, but the bitterest passages are directed against the false philosophers,—those “who should rather be called *φιλοσώματοι*.”¹ The principal points in his arguments have been summed up by Baumgart (pp. 24–35). But one or two points may well be amplified for the sake of showing more clearly the influence of the Isocratean tradition on Aristides.

It is important to notice that Aristides is not merely trying to drive the philosophers from the province that rightfully belongs to rhetoric. Any compromise by which rhetoric and philosophy should exist on equal terms is unthinkable. For

¹ II, p. 408. The passage from p. 399 to p. 414 is devoted to the attack on philosophy.

to Aristides, as a true representative of Isocrates, rhetoric takes the place of philosophy.¹ No polite phrases of compliment² can obscure the fact that Aristides believes that whatever philosophy does, rhetoric can do better.³ In the speech *Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς* he takes up Plato's criticisms of rhetoric, and shows that the supposed faults are really virtues, or that the same charges can be made with greater justice against philosophy. Several of the passages presenting the orator as philosopher have necessarily been included in the discussion of the orator as statesman.⁴ I shall add some passages to illustrate the connection between rhetoric and thought, and between rhetoric and ethics.

In demonstrating the identity of the thinker and the speaker he quotes Hesiod (*Ἑργ.*, 293, 295):

¹ He discusses the original meaning of *σοφιστής* and *φιλόσοφος*, II, pp. 407 ff. *σοφιστής* = *σοφός*. In this sense it was applied by Herodotus to Solon and Pythagoras, by Androtion to the Seven Sages and to Socrates. Isocrates applied the term *σοφιστής* to the teachers of eristic and dialectic, and called himself a *φιλόσοφος*—*φιλόσοφον δ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἔξιν φιλοσόφους*. (Haas, *Quibus fontibus Aelius Aristides in componenda declamatione, quae inscribitur Πρὸς Πλάτωνα . . . usus sit*, p. 54, supposes that this is a quotation from the lost part of the *Κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν*.) As his own definition Aristides gives (407): *ἀλλ' οἶμαι καὶ σοφιστῆς ἐπεικῶς κοινὸν ἦν ὄνομα καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία τοῦτ' ἡδύνατο, φιλοκαλία τις εἶναι καὶ διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους* (cf. *Ant.*, 186 ff.), *καὶ οὐχ ὁ νῦν τρόπος οὗτος* (i. e., the narrow view held at present), *ἀλλὰ παιδεία κοινῶς*. Plato, he continues, used *φιλόσοφος* in this broad sense and in the narrower meaning—*τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἰδέας πραγματευομένους καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ὑπερορῶντας*—a definition which he would apply only to the followers of Plato and Pythagoras; the other sects are *φιλοσώματα*.

² *E. g.*, II, p. 410: *καὶ ταῦτα μηδεὶς οἰέσθω βλασφημίαν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἔχειν μηδ' ἀηδὲς μηδεμὲν λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολλῶ μᾶλλον ὑπὲρ φιλοσοφίας εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ταύτην εἰρήσθαι*.

II, p. 413: *οἶμαι δὲ καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι τῶν ἐκ' ἑμαυτοῦ φιλοσοφούντων τοῖς ἀρστέοις καὶ τελειωτέοις, καὶ οὐ πολλῶν ἡττᾶσθαι ταύτῃ θνητῶν, καὶ ἐν τροφῇ μοῖρα γεγενῆσιν μοι. ὥστε τοῖς οἰκοι πολεμοῖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις*.

³ Cf. II, p. 82: If philosophy prevents *ἀδικεῖν*, and rhetoric *ἀδικεῖσθαι*, rhetoric by removing *ἀδικεῖσθαι* has also prevented *ἀδικεῖν*, etc.

⁴ II, p. 361: *ῥήτωρ καὶ σοφός*.

II, p. 129: *οὐκ ἔρα τοῦ φιλοσόφου μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος εἶδέναι πότε χρῆ σιωπᾶν*.

Κείνος μὲν πανάριστος δὲ αὐτῷ πάντα νοήση:
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείνος δὲ εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

and gives this commentary (II, p. 32): οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσας ἐστὶν ὁ εὖ εἰπὼν· εἰ δὲ βούλει ἐκείνως, ὁ μὲν εὖ εἰπὼν ἐστὶν ὁ νοήσας αὐτὸς ἅπαντα.¹ . . . μετείληφεν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐπὶ τοῦ εὖ εἰπόντος τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λέγων, ἀντὶ τοῦ νοήσαντος τὸν εὖ εἰπόντα θεί, ὡς αὐτὸν τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν βέλτιστον ῥήτορα.

The identification of the original thinker with the orator is even stronger in II, p. 98: . . . οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἄλλο ῥητορικὴ ἢ φρόνησις λόγων δύναμιν προσειληφυῖα, ὡς μὴ μόνον αὐτὸς ἔρδειν τὰ βέλτιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους πείθειν ἔχει. II, p. 133: ἐστὶν ἄρα ῥητορικῆς ἔργον καὶ φρονεῖν ὁρθῶς καὶ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν ἀδεῖ πράττοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους πείθοντα ἀδεῖ πράττειν παρέχεσθαι.

In reply to Plato's comparison of rhetoric to the art of the pilot he says that the pilot merely saves men, good and bad alike, but the ῥήτωρ *knows* whom to save and whom to kill. II, p. 122: ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ οὐ σώζειν οἶδε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκτινύνειν καὶ ἐκβάλλειν οὓς ἄμεινον· ὥστε τέλειον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ κράτος τῷ ῥήτορι.

In II, p. 129, we have a direct comparison between the knowledge of the philosopher and the knowledge of the ῥήτωρ. καὶ μὴν ὁ γε εἰδὼς τί δεῖ λέγειν οἶδε τί δεῖ σιωπῆσαι καὶ πότ' ἄμεινον εἰπεῖν καὶ πότ' ἔασαι. . . . οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ φιλοσόφου μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος εἰδέναι πότε χρή σιωπᾶν. κτλ.

I have shown that Isocrates, Cicero and Dionysius made the orator supreme in the sphere of ethics which is more strictly the province of the philosopher. The same view appears in Aristides. First the ῥήτωρ is a good man himself, made so by the necessity of his profession.

II, p. 83: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε ἑτέρους τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ἐπαναγκάζων πολὺ πρῶτον αὐτὸς γε παρσκευάζεται. οὐ γὰρ ἐγχευρεῖ βοηθεῖν

¹ Cf. Isoc. Ant., 277: . . . ὥσθ' ἅμα τὸ λέγειν εὖ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν παραγενήσεται τοῖς φιλοσόφους καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τοὺς λόγους διακειμένους.

The phrase εὖ εἰπὼν naturally assumes in a rhetorician a meaning quite different from that which it had in Hesiod.

μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ, τοῦ δὲ καταλύειν τὸ δίκαιον αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν. οὐκοῦν ὁ ῥήτωρ οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀδικήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἕτερον ἑάσει. . . . 84: ὁ μὲν γὰρ καλὸς τε κάγαθός οὐ πάντη ῥήτωρ, ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ καλὸς κάγαθός, ὅς γε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ἄγει.¹

The virtue of the ῥήτωρ is of course only a preliminary to his great task of producing virtue among mankind.² The four parts of virtue are all connected with rhetoric: II, p. 72: ἀλλὰ μὴν τῆς γε ἀρετῆς τέτταρα δὴ πού φασιν εἶναι μόρια, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν. ῥητορικὴ τοίνυν εὐρέθῃ μὲν ἐν φρονήσει καὶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, σωφροσύνη δὲ τῶν ἐχόντων καὶ ἀνδρεία τὰς πόλεις σώζει. . . . τεττάρων ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς ἅπαντα δι' αὐτῆς πεποιήται. The same thought is repeated almost verbatim on page 128.

As an example of this we have the character of the Athenians under the rule of Pericles, II, p. 179: καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἐτίμων κακέεινον καὶ τοὺς λόγους, τοσοῦτῳ κοσμιώτερον καὶ σωφρονέστερον αὐτῶν ἐξεσθαι καὶ πάσης παρανομίας ἀφέξεσθαι.

This presentation of Aristides' views on rhetoric will, I hope, serve to show that while he has few actual quotations from Isocrates, his point of view is essentially Isocratean in that he glorifies the orator as the true statesman, general and philosopher.

THE PSEUDO-LUCIANIC LAUDATIO DEMOSTHENIS

In the Encomium of Demosthenes that has come down to us in the Lucianic corpus we have a good example of the ascription of all virtues to the orator. Demosthenes was not only a model of virtue in private life, and a wonderful speaker, but was especially remarkable for σύνεσις and φρόνημα as a statesman, and had all the qualities essential for a general,—had he only taken the field Philip would have been forced to fight for the possession of Macedonia.

I give below several passages to illustrate the author's

¹ Cf. Isoc. Ant., 278: καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὁ πείθειν βουλόμενος ἀμελήσει τῆς ἀρετῆς κτλ.

² Cf. p. 14.

attitude. A general review of all his qualities—18: σὺ δ' εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Δημοσθένην ὅλον ἐφάπαξ τῇ γνώμῃ τράποιο, καὶ μάλα ἂν ἀποροῖς περὶ τὸν λόγον ἄττων οὐδ' ἔχων ὅτου πρώτου τῇ γνώμῃ λάβοιο . . . οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σὲ μεταπηδᾶν οὐκ ἔχοντα ἐφ' ὅτι σταίης, ἐν κύκλῳ σε περιελκόντων φύσεως μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ὁρμῆς διαπύρου, βίου σώφρονος, λόγου δεινότητος, τῆς ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀνδρείας, λημμάτων πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ὑπεροψίας, δικαιοσύνης φιλανθρωπίας πίστεως φρονήματος συνέσεως, ἐκάστου τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων πολιτευμάτων.

Farther on in the treatise emphasis is laid on the fact that Demosthenes was more remarkable as a statesman than as an orator.

32: ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τινα πάντων καὶ Δημοσθένην αὐτὸς τε δις Ἀθήνησιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ πολλὴν σχολήν, συγγενόμενος καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναπνυθαιόμενος ἔκ τε τῶν πολιτευμάτων αὐτῶν εἶχον θαυμάσας, οὐχ ὥς ἂν νομίσειε τις, τῆς τῶν λόγων δεινότητος . . . 33: ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην (τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ λόγου) μὲν δευτέραν ἔταττον ἐν χώρᾳ τιθεὶς ὄργανον, Δημοσθένην δὲ αὐτὸν ὑπερηγάμην τοῦ τε φρονήματος καὶ τῆς συνέσεως.

πειθῶ and γνώμῃ are coupled in chapter 34:

τῆς ὅπλων βίας τὴν τοῦ λόγου πειθῶ καὶ τὸ τῆς γνώμης ἐμβριθὲς οὐδαμῇ τιθεὶς δεύτερον.

He is the equal of Themistocles and Pericles. 37: δ γὰρ Ἀθηναίοις τοῖς πάλαι¹ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Περικλῆς ἐγένετο, τοῦτο τοῖς νῦν ὁ Δημοσθένης, ἐφάμιλλος Θεμιστοκλεῖ μὲν τὴν σύνεσιν, Περικλεῖ δὲ τὸ φρόνημα.

He would have made a successful general. 37: (Philip speaks) καὶ καλῶς γε, ἔφη, ποιοῦσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Χάρητα μὲν καὶ Διοπεύην καὶ Πρόξενον καὶ τοιοῦτους τινὰς ἀποδεικνύντες στρατηγεῖν. Δημοσθένην δὲ εἴσω κατέχοντες ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος. ὥς εἰ τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅπλων ἀπέφηναν καὶ νεῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων καὶ καιρῶν καὶ χρημάτων κύριον, ὁκνῶ μὴ περὶ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἂν κατέστησέ μοι τὸν λόγον.

Chapter 38 continues in a similar strain. His adherence

¹ Cf. Cicero's *veteres illi*.

to the Isocratean ideal is well summed up in the phrase (41):

αὐτῷ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν γυμνάσιον φιλοσοφίας προθέμενος.

He is orator, philosopher, statesman and general, and his philosophy is that of Isocrates, the philosophy that is practical.

CONCLUSION

With the discussion of the influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius, Aristides and the author of the *Laudatio Demosthenis* this dissertation comes to an end. To follow all the ramifications of the subject would involve making several independent studies. The introduction of Aristides naturally suggests the question of the Second Sophistic and its antecedents.¹ Then, again, it has not been possible to consider the problem of the fragments of Philodemus, and the possible relation between them and the lost treatise of Dionysius *Ἐπεὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς φιλοσοφίας πρὸς τοὺς κατατρέχοντας αὐτῆς ἀδίκως*.² In

¹ Cf. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman*², p. 312n. He considers the Second Sophistic a continuation of Asianism. This position is attacked by Kaibel in *Hermes*, XX (1885), 497, who regards Aristides as a successor of Dionysius and Isocrates, and minimizes the Asiatic influence. He is answered by Rohde in *Rh. Mus.*, XLI (1886), 170, who draws the distinction between Aristides and the other Sophists of his time. Aristides, he says, is not typical. In fact he is opposed to the main currents of thought of the age. The apparent connection between the Second Sophistic and the old Attic orators which is suggested by Philostratus' mention of Aeschines as the first representative of the Second Sophistic is explained by Schmid, *Atticismus* I 28 ff. cf. also Brandstaetter, *Leipziger Studien*, 15 (1894), 260 ff. Norden (*Antike Kunstprosa*, 353 f.) thinks that both Kaibel and Rohde are right in that the conflict between Atticism and Asianism continued during the period designated as Second Sophistic, and some writers (Aristides in particular) clung to the Attic revival while others maintained the tradition of Asianism. The view of Norden, 354, that Asianism is a development of the old sophistic would seem to include Isocrates as a possible source of Asianism, and to be at variance with my view that Isocrates was a model for the Atticists. The discrepancy is only apparent, however. Isocrates was not used by the Asianists as a model (Schmid, *Atticismus*, II, 3, n. 3). So that Isocrates was not a part of the tradition of the Asian school, and for that reason was well fitted to be an authority for the Atticists.

² Cf. Usener's preface to his edition of Dionysius, p. xxxv.

this dissertation the aim has been to present studies in a few authors who reveal the influence of Isocrates, and to point to the possibility of similar discoveries in allied fields.

APPENDIX

On pages 6-9 I suggested that by *idéai* Isocrates meant the "thought elements" or "ideas" which were used in literary composition, that he made it a part of his course of instruction to present to his pupils a series of these *idéai*, and that in the *Πρὸς Νικοκλέα* we have a collection of such "ideas" on government without the rhetorical embellishment with which Isocrates would ordinarily have presented them to his readers. To confirm that suggestion I now propose to compare some of the thoughts of the *Πρὸς Νικοκλέα* with the form in which these thoughts are developed in other treatises—an analysis which I hope may throw some light on Isocrates' methods of composition.

In the examples to be presented below five methods of treating the *idéai* are used. (1) The *idéa* is expanded by enumerating details, or by substituting for a name of a class the names of the objects forming the class. A very simple example will suffice to illustrate my meaning. The word *θηρία* in the sentence *περὶ τὰ θηρία τέχνας εὐρήκαμεν, αἷς αὐτῶν τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμεροῦμεν* (Ad Nic., 12) appears in the expanded form in one place as *ἵπποι, κύνες, τὰ πλείστα τῶν ζώων* (Ant., 211), in another as *λέοντες, ἄρκτοι* (Ant., 213). (2) A similar method is that by which a thought or *idéa* expressed in abstract or semi-scientific terms is developed into the plainer and more circumstantial language of every-day life. For example, Ad Nic., 31, *τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἡθὺς ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν* becomes in Nic., 37, *φιλεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τοῦτοις τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι τὸν βίον διάγειν, ἐν οἷς ἂν τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς αὐτῶν ὀρώσι διατρίβοντας*. (3) The reverse of this process may be employed. Naturally examples of this are rare, as the normal arrangement is that the scholastic statement is abstract and the concrete form is

best adapted to public presentation. For an instance of this usage see *b* and *b'* below, p. 69. (4) The thought is repeated, each time with a different example, and the changes made necessary by the change in example. Thus the thought that careful training (*ἐπιμέλεια*) is useful in everything else and therefore must be useful in improving character, is developed in *Ant.*, 209 ff., in a threefold fashion, comparing the effect of *ἐπιμέλεια* on the soul with its effect on (a) *πάσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς τέχνας*, (b) *σώματα*, (c) *ἵππους, κύνες*. (5) Perhaps the commonest method of development is by contrast or balance of thought. Thus in *Ad Nic.*, 17, he gives the qualities of good laws; they must be just, useful, consistent, etc. Then in *Panath.*, 144, wishing to show that the old laws of Athens were good, he first tells what they were not, and then gives as the affirmative side the qualities enumerated in *Ad Nic.*, 17. This balancing of thought, this continuous use of the formulas *μὲν . . . δέ, οὐ . . . ἀλλά* is a mannerism with Isocrates, so much so that it appears at times even in the otherwise simple and straightforward style of the *Πρὸς Νικοκλέα*.

These are the methods of expanding an idea which are the most obvious. A more careful examination of the orations with this in mind would doubtless reveal many more. A few examples may now be taken up to illustrate the way in which the various methods were combined.

Ad Nic., 12, appears in an expanded form in *Ant.*, 209 ff. In *Ad Nic.* we find two ideas: one that careful training will improve the mind; the other, if we can train animals we can train men. The way in which these ideas are developed in the *Antidosis* can best be shown by arranging the passages in parallel columns.

Ad Nic., 12

Ant., 209 ff.

<p>(a) καὶ μὴ νόμιζε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις πράγμασι χρησίμην εἶναι,</p>	<p>(a') πρῶτον μὲν εἰ πάσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς τέχνας εἰδότες ταῖς μελέταις καὶ ταῖς φιλοπονοῖαις ἀλίσκομένας,</p>
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(b) πρὸς δὲ τὸ βελτίους (b') πρὸς τὴν τῆς φρονή-
 ήμᾱς καὶ φρονιμωτέρους σεως ἄσκησιν ταῦτα μηδεμίαν
 γίγνεσθαι μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν, ἡγοῦνται δύναμιν ἔχειν.

(a'' b'') ἔπειτ' εἰ τῶν μὲν σω-
 μάτων μηδὲν οὕτως ἂν φήσειαν
 εἶναι φαῦλον, ὃ τι γυμνασθὲν
 καὶ πονήσαν οὐκ ἂν εἴη βέλτιον,
 τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς τὰς ἄμεινον πεφυ-
 κίας τῶν σωμάτων μηδὲν ἂν
 νομίζουσι γενέσθαι σπουδαιοτέρας
 παιδευθείσας καὶ τυχοῦσας τῆς
 προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας·

(c) μηδὲ καταγνώσ τῶν ἀν-
 θρώπων τοσαύτην δυστυχίαν,
 ὥς περὶ μὲν θηρία τέχνας εὖ-
 ρήκαμεν, αἷς αὐτῶν τὰς ψυχὰς
 ἡμεροῦμεν καὶ πλείονος
 ἀξίας ποιοῦμεν, ἡμᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς
 οὐδὲν ἂν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὠφελήσασαιμεν.

(c') ἔτι δ' εἰ περὶ τοὺς ἱπποὺς
 καὶ τοὺς κύνας καὶ τὰ πλείστα
 τῶν ζώων ὀρῶντες τέχνας ἔχον-
 τὰς τινας, αἷς τὰ μὲν ἀνδρείο-
 τερα, τὰ δὲ πραότερα, τὰ δὲ
 φρονιμώτερα ποιοῦσι, περὶ
 τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν μηδεμίαν
 οἶονται τοιαύτην εὐρῆσθαι παι-
 δεῖαν, ἥτις ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τι τοῦτων
 ὦν περ καὶ τὰ θηρία δυνηθεῖη προα-
 γαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοσαύτην ἀπάντων
 ἡμῶν ἀτυχίαν καταγνώκα-
 σιν, ὥσθ' ὁμολογήσειαν μὲν ἂν
 ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοαῖς ἕκαστον
 τῶν ὄντων βέλτιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ
 χρησιμώτερον, αὐτοὺς δ' ἡμᾶς
 τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν φρόνησιν ταύτην,
 ἢ πάντα πλείονος ἀξία ποιοῦμεν,
 τολμῶσι λέγειν, ὥς οὐδὲν ἂν
 ἀλλήλους πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν εὐερ-
 γετήσασαιμεν.

(c'') ὁ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον,
 ὅτι καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν
 θεωροῦντες ἐν τοῖς θαύμασι τοὺς
 μὲν λέοντας πρῶτον διακειμέ-
 νους πρὸς τοὺς θεραπεύοντας ἢ
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνιοι πρὸς τοὺς
 εὖ ποιοῦντας, τὰς δ' ἄρκτους
 καλινδουμένας καὶ μιμουμένας τὰς
 ἡμετέρας ἐπιστήμας, οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ-
 των δύνανται γινῶναι τὴν παιδείαν
 καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὅσην ἔχει
 δύναμιν, οὐδ' ὅτι ταῦτα πολὺ ἀν-
 θᾶττον τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν ἢ
 τὴν ἐκείνων ὠφελήσειεν.

(a') is expanded from (a) by enumeration of details:

ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πράγμασι ~ πάσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς τέχνας

ἐπιμέλεια ~ ταῖς μελέταις καὶ ταῖς φιλοπονίαις

(b') is a restatement of (b) in more abstract form:

πρὸς δὲ τὸ βελτίους ἡμᾶς καὶ φρονιμωτέρους γίγνεσθαι ~ πρὸς τὴν
 τῆς φρονήσεως ἀσκησιν

(a''b'') is a doublet of (a) and (b), giving a single illustration
 (σῶμα) of the phrase πάσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς τέχνας.

The second thought (c) is developed by means of contrast
 of a negative statement with an affirmative. In the passage
 in the Antidosis certain adjective phrases have been added
 which merely bring out the thought implied in the original
 statement.

μηδὲ καταγνώσ τῶν ἀνθρώ-
 πων τοσαύτην δυστυχίαν ὥς
 περὶ μὲν θηρία τέχνας εὐρήκαμεν
 αἷς κτλ.

περὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 φύσιν μηδεμίαν οἴονται τοσαύ-
 την εὐρησθαι παιδείαν ἥτις . . .
 ἀλλὰ τοσαύτην ἀπάντων ἡμῶν
 ἀτυχίαν κατεγνώκασιν
 ὥσθ' ὁμολογήσειαν. . . .

Here the words *μηδεμίαν . . . ἀλλὰ* introduce the usual contrast between the negative and affirmative statements of the thought. Note also the presence of certain words in both Ad Nic. and Ant. *μηδὲ καταγνῶς . . . δυστυχίαν* ∞ *ὥς . . . ἀτυχίαν* *κατεγνώκασιν ὥσθ . . .*, forming, as it were, a framework on which the expanded form is put.

Finally the thought of training animals (*c-c'*) is presented again with different examples:

περὶ θηρία κτλ. ∞ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \delta \delta \epsilon \pi \acute{\alpha} \nu \tau \omega \nu \delta \epsilon \iota \nu \acute{o} \tau \alpha \tau \omicron \nu \dots \tau \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \lambda \epsilon \omicron \nu \tau \alpha \varsigma, \\ \pi \rho \acute{\alpha} \tau \epsilon \rho \omicron \nu \delta \iota \alpha \kappa \epsilon \iota \mu \acute{\epsilon} \nu \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \dots, \\ \tau \acute{\alpha} \varsigma \delta' \acute{\alpha} \rho \kappa \tau \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \kappa \alpha \lambda \iota \nu \delta \omicron \upsilon \mu \acute{\epsilon} \nu \alpha \varsigma, \dots \end{array} \right.$

Ad Nic., 17, *ζήτει νόμους . . . ποιούσιν* is developed in Panath., 144. In the Ad Nicoclem the requisites for good laws are stated; they must be just, useful, consistent, and prevent long and troublesome litigation. Isocrates develops this in the Antidosis by contrast. Speaking of the good old laws, he first enumerates the qualities they did not possess, *ἑώρων τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγεγραμμένους, οὐχ ὁμοίους τοῖς νῦν κειμένοις, οὐδὲ κτλ.*, then he introduces with *ἀλλὰ* the positive qualities of the laws.

Ad Nic., 17

*ζήτει νόμους . . . δικαίους καὶ συμφέροντας καὶ σφί-
σιν αὐτοῖς ὁμολογουμέ-
νους, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις οἵτινες
τὰς μὲν ἀμφισβητήσεις ὥς ἐλαχί-
στας, τὰς δὲ διαλύσεις ὥς οἷον τε
ταχίστας τοῖς πολίταις ποιούσιν.*

Panath., 144

*ἑώρων τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγε-
γραμμένους, οὐχ ὁμοίους τοῖς νῦν
κειμένοις, οὐδὲ τοσαύτης ταραχῆς
καὶ τοσούτων ἐναντιώσεων με-
στοὺς ὥστε μὴδὲν ἂν δυνηθῆναι
συνιδεῖν μήτε τοὺς χρησίμους μήτε
τοὺς ἀχρήστους αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ
πρῶτον μὲν ὀλίγους, ἱκανοὺς δὲ
τοῖς χρῆσθαι μέλλουσι καὶ ῥαδίους
συνιδεῖν, ἔπειτα δικαίους καὶ
συμφέροντας καὶ σφίσι
αὐτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους.*


The thought of Ad Nic., 31, is developed in Nicocles, 37, by putting in a detailed and concrete form what is expressed as an abstract principle in the Ad Nic.

Ad Nic., 31

μη τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀξίου
κοσμίως ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ βασιλέας
ἀτάκτως, ἀλλὰ τὴν σωφρο-
σύνην παράδειγμα τοῖς
ἄλλοις καθίστη, γιγνώσκων, ὅτι
τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἡθος
ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν.

Nicocles, 37

περὶ σωφροσύνης . . . ἅμα
δὲ παράδειγμα καταστήσαι
τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἐμᾶντοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις
πολίταις, γιγνώσκων, ὅτι φι-
λεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τούτοις
τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι τὸν
βίον διάγειν, ἐν οἷς ἂν
τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς αὐ-
τῶν ὁρῶσι διατρίβοντας.



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